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Abstract
This Article explores the extent to which the dispute settlement system of the WTO would
be suitable in resolving competition-related cases. It first recalls that under existing trade rules,
national competition law and practice are not exempt from, but rather subject to, the application of
the dispute settlement system. Both competition laws as such and their application in individual
cases must comply with the current, substantive standards of the WTO Agreement, and complaints
can be brought against both. Extending the application of the dispute settlement system to a new
agreement to be negotiated in the area of competition would produce no qualitative innovation.
Drawing a parallel to the area of trade remedies, this Article further argues that the standard of
review applied in WTO dispute settlement would also be appropriate for competition cases. This
standard of review excludes de novo review, but sets rather high standards for the national authorities’ duties of investigation and explanation. The dispute settlement system, however, shows
significant weaknesses in connection to the fact-finding conducted by panels. Competition-related
cases–as is usual in the area of economic law in general, and of trade remedies in particular–are
very fact-intensive. In the dispute settlement system of the WTO, it is the task of the panels to establish the facts, whereas the Appellate Body addresses only questions of law. In order to achieve
the objective of establishing the relevant facts of a case, panels can resort to experts. They can also
seek information from WTO Members, who must respond, lest they should face the risk of negative inferences being drawn from their behavior. A serious weakness, however, exists with regard
to the treatment of confidential information, for which no generally applicable rules of procedure
exist to date. For the dispute settlement system to be able to apply effectively to a review of individual decisions under a future WTO competition agreement, it would be important to overcome
this impediment, which, already today, regularly creates significant practical problems. Another
weakness is rooted in the non-permanent character of the panels. A body composed of ad hoc
selected members cannot be expected to conduct fact-finding with the same determination as a
permanent body. It would therefore be beneficial to increase the structural independence of panel
members.
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WTO and the stronger force that these agreements thus have
is one of the reasons why the proponents of a WTO competition agreement favor the WTO as a negotiation forum. Nevertheless, several of these proponents contemplate at most a
limited future role for the WTO dispute settlement system
within a future competition agreement. At the outset, the
United States in particular took a skeptical approach, which
the European Communities seem to have now joined in.
In order to address some of the objections voiced against
the full application of the dispute settlement system in this
area, this Article explores the extent to which the dispute settlement system of the WTO would be suitable in resolving
competition related cases. It first recalls that under existing
trade rules, national competition law and practice are not exempt from, but rather subject to, the application of the dispute settlement system. Both competition laws as such and
their application in individual cases must comply with the
current substantive standards of the WTO Agreement, and
complaints can be brought against both. Extending the application of the dispute settlement system to a new agreement
to be negotiated in the area of competition would therefore
be no qualitative innovation.
Drawing a parallel to the area of trade remedies, this Article further argues that the standard of review applied in
WTO dispute settlement would also be appropriate for competition cases. This standard of review excludes de novo review, but sets rather high standards for the national authorities' duties of investigation and explanation.
The dispute settlement system, however, shows significant weaknesses in connection to the fact-finding conducted
by panels. Competition related cases - as is usual in the area
of economic law in general, and of trade remedies in particular - are very fact-intensive. In the dispute settlement system
of the WTO, it is the task of the panels to establish the facts,
whereas the Appellate Body addresses only questions of law.
In order to achieve the objective of establishing the relevant
facts of a case, panels can resort to experts. They can also
seek information from WTO Members, who must respond,
lest they should face the risk of negative inferences being
drawn from their behavior.
A serious weakness, however, exists with regard to the
treatment of confidential information, for which no generally
applicable rules of procedure exist to date. For the dispute
settlement system to be able to apply effectively to a review of
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individual decisions under a future WTO competition agreement, it would be important to overcome this impediment,
which, already today, regularly creates significant practical
problems. Another weakness is rooted in the non-permanent
character of the panels. A body composed of ad hoc selected
members cannot be expected to conduct fact-finding with the
same determination as a permanent body. It would therefore
be beneficial to increase the structural independence of
panel members.

INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the question of whether and to what ex7
tent the current dispute settlement system of the WTO
' is suitable for application to the area of competition law. In particular,

it examines whether there are fundamental objections to using
the WTO's current dispute settlement system in the framework
of a future WTO Agreement on Competition.
The Article will be limited to problems specific to dispute
settlement in the area of competition. There is no ambition to
respond to the question of what kind of rules should be negotiated and agreed on for a future competition agreement within
the WTO, be it by all or by some of the WTO Members. It is well
known that this question is controversial. Not only do Members
with different levels of economic development have different answers to this question, but there is also a divide between the European Communities and the United States. For the sake of simplicity, this Article assumes that negotiations will ultimately result in an agreement containing competition rules and that most
of these rules will be binding on the signatories.2
The assumption of a successful conclusion of a WTO competition agreement is not even necessary for the discussion following hereafter. This Article will show that competition related

behavior of WTO Members is already subject to the existing dispute settlement rules of the WTO. In any event, negotiations
1. The WTO has been created by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL 1,
33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter 'WTO Agreement].
2. For the background and the current state of discussions with regard to the possible content of a future WI7O competition agreement, see Robert D. Anderson & Peter
Holmes, Competition Policy and the Future of the MultilateralTradingSystem, 5J. INT'L ECON.
L. 531-63 (2002). See also the recent work of PHILIP MARSDEN, A COMPETITION POLICY
FOR THE WA
TO (2003).
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about a future WTO competition agreement will help the participants to sharpen their understanding of the problems involved. Whether they will reinforce or mitigate the problems
that exist today will depend on the type and scope of the rules to
be negotiated. In this context, one should think not only about
the provisions of a future WTO competition agreement, but also
about the reform of the existing dispute settlement rules.'

I. DIGRESSION INTO THE RESULTS OF THE
DOHA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
It is anything but certain whether the Doha Ministerial Conference will truly result in negotiations about a future WTO competition agreement. The Ministerial Declaration seems to support such an assumption as it contains the following paragraphs
about the subject:
Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy
23. Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of competition policy to international
trade and development, and the need for enhanced technical
assistance and capacity building in this area as referred to in
paragraph 24, we agree that negotiations will take place after the
Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a
decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on
modalities of negotiations. [emphasis added]
24. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced support for technical assistance
and capacity building in this area, including policy analysis
and development so that they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human and institutional development. To this end, we shall work in cooperation with
other relevant intergovernmental organisations, including
UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral
3. The Marrakech Ministerial Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of 1994
called for a full review of the DSU within four years after the entry into force of the
NWTO Agreement. The review started in 1997 but did not result in an agreement.
Building "on the work done thus far", the Doha Ministerial Declaration contains a mandate for "negotiations on improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding." WTO, Ministeial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, 4th Sess., Doha Ministerial conf. para. 30, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001). The Members' reform proposals tabled to date are accessible at http://www.wto.o-g/english/tratop-e/
dispue/
disptie.htm. All WTO documents are available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
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channels, to provide strengthened and adequately resourced
assistance to respond to these needs.
25. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy will focus on the clarification of: core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore cartels; modalities
for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries
through capacity building. Full account shall be taken of the
needs of developing and least-developed country participants
and appropriate flexibility provided to address them.4
Paragraph 23 addresses "modalities" to be decided on for
the future negotiations. It seems that the participants of the
Doha Ministerial Conference reached agreement on the principle
that negotiations on a competition agreement will start. Paragraph 23, however, mandates that a decision on "modalities" be
taken "by explicit consensus." What will happen, if that decision
by "explicit consensus" cannot be reached?
The Doha Ministerial Declaration does not stand in isolation: it is well-known that in order to overcome the resistance of
the Indian delegation, Youssef Kamal, the Chairman of the Conference, issued a statement in which he explained his understanding of the "modalities" mentioned in paragraph 23. According to this understanding, the requirement of an "explicit
consensus" gives "each Member the right to take a position on
modalities that would prevent negotiations from proceeding after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference until that
Member is prepared to join an explicit consensus. '15 Whatever
the status of this statement under public international law, it
confirms the doubts raised by the requirement of an "explicit
consensus" itself.'
4. Ministerial Declaration, supra n.3, at para. 30.
5. See Chairman's statement, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
minist_e/min01_e/min0 lchair speaking-e.htn.
6. The concept of an "explicit consensus" cannot have been intended as an oxymoron. The attribute "explicit" therefore seems to stIggest that, unlike in the case of an
ordinary consensus requirement, the mere absence of objection from any Member is
insufficient, but it is not clear how much more than that is required. The observation
of Chairman Kamal could also be made about a normal consensus requirement if one
understands "right" as "ability." If one understands "right" seriously, the statement goes
beyond merely reflecting the obvious meaning of either a consensus or an explicit consensus requirement, given the Ministers' agreement "that negotiations will take place."
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Even if, in principle, the start of negotiations on a competition agreement has been agreed, this says nothing so far about
the outcome and the content. Paragraph 25 of the Ministerial
declaration indicates that negotiations will probably deal with
the topics which are to be clarified in the Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, headed by
Professor F.Jenny. These topics are: "core principles, including
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and
provisions on hardcore cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of competition
institutions in developing countries through capacity building."
Paragraph 23 indicates that the objective of negotiations should
be "a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of
competition policy to international trade and development."
However, would a multilateral framework necessarily consist of
binding rules? Or could it also be a mixture of binding and nonbinding rules? Or even an agreement containing no binding
rules at all? The likelihood of such an agreement without any
binding rules is ultimately quite low, given that the WTO - like
its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT" or "GATT 1994") - has traditionally been a forum for
the adoption of binding rules.
II. COMMITMENTS TO ADOPT AND APPLY CERTAIN RULES
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THESE COMMITMENTS
Let us recall the hypothesis that a future WTO competition
agreement will contain binding rules. Let us also recall the assumption that these rules will cover subject matters, which are to
be further clarified in the consultations of the Working Group
on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy.
These subject matters are "hardcore" cartels, transparency, nondiscrimination, and procedural fairness.
For the Members who will sign the agreement, these commitments will have a twofold meaning. First, they will have to
adapt their national laws to the requirements of the agreement.
They will therefore have to amend their national laws wherever
such rules (e.g., on hardcore cartels or procedural fairness) are
either absent or insufficient to meet fully the requirements of
the agreement. Second, these Members will have to ensure that
these adopted or modified national rules are applied in accor-
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dance with the agreement. By outlining these two types of obligations, we presuppose what is standard in WTO law, but not
necessarily in traditional public international law. Where an
agreement prescribes or prohibits a certain conduct ("do not afford less favorable treatment"), what matters is the treatment actually afforded by that State. But with Article XVI:4, the WTO
Agreement also focuses on the Members' laws and procedures
that must conform to their obligations. In addition, it is likely
that any future WTO competition agreement will expressly require Members not only to take certain actions, but also to adopt
laws to that effect. In this regard, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") was an interesting precedent.
Within disputes between signatories about the fulfilment of
the obligations arising from a future WTO competition agreement, one can also draw the distinction between controversies
relating to the amendment of national laws and those relating to
the application of these laws. The former will concern whether
the responding Member has complied with its obligation to
adapt its domestic law. The latter controversy will focus on
whether the correctly implemented WTO obligations have been
complied with in an individual case.
Normally it is not important to distinguish between these
two obligations and their judicial enforcement. For the discussion about a future WTO competition agreement, however, this
distinction has fundamental significance because there are very
divergent views about the scope and the enforcement of these
two kinds of obligations. The resistance of the United States to a
binding competition agreement to be negotiated within the
WTO is particularly directed at a multilateral review of the application of the rules to be agreed.
III. THE DIFFERENT POSITIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES AND THE UNITED STATES
A. The FundamentalImportance of the WJ'O
Dispute Settlement System
The famous Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, more simply called "Dispute
Settlement Understanding" ("DSU"), which was negotiated in
the Uruguay Round, provides for an obligatory and exclusive,
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quasi-judicial system of adjudication. For a nearly universal international agreement, this system is unique in its automatic and
obligatory character. Although the DSU builds on the practice
and experience under the old GATT, the new system of WTO
dispute settlement is fundamentally different from the former
system, which was much more devoted to a diplomatic search for
consensus. It is true that the DSU continues to contain non-judicial elements (such as the necessity of a formal adoption of
panel and Appellate Body reports by the Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB"), but these non-judicial elements are significantly
weaker than they have been and they are also much weaker than
the elements of typical adjudication. This is particularly true for
the appellate review, but at the same time not central to the subject of this Article.
The DSU itself emphasizes the fundamental importance of
the dispute settlement system for the WTO. Article 3.2 of the
DSU states, inter alia: "The dispute settlement system of the
WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability
to the multilateral trading system." Predictability and security
are important for any legal system. In the WTO, these elements
have additional importance because international trade is typically conducted by private economic operators, not by States,
and private economic operators need stability and predictability
for their commercial transactions.7
In accordance with its fundamental character, the WTO dispute settlement system applies to both of the previously mentioned types of disputes. In other words, it is available both for
controversies regarding the legislative implementation of WTO
obligations in domestic law and for controversies concerning
compliance with these provisions where they are to be applied in
an individual case.
B. The InitialPosition of the European Commission
The new dispute settlement system of the WT played a decisive role in the European Commission's reflection about the
appropriate forum for the negotiation of a worldwide competi7. See a1o
REPORT,

UNITED STATES -

SECTIONS

301-310

OF THEI

TRADF AcT

OF

1974,

PANEL

WrT/DS152/R Section 301 (Jan. 27, 2000), para. 7.77, 39 I.L.M. 452 (2000)

[hereinafter

U.S.-SECTION

301

PANl

REPOR'].

WTO panel reports and Appellate

Body Reports are available at http:// wAv.wto.org/english /tratope/dispue/dispue.htm.
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tion agreement. The Commission's Communication to the
Council of the European Union, Towards an internationalframework of competition rules ofJune 18, 1996, stated with regard to the
question of "which forum":
The institutional infrastructure of the WTO includes a system
of transparency and surveillance through notification requirements and monitoring provisions. These are common
to many WTO/GATT Agreements. The WTO also provides a
forum for continuous negotiation and consultation, where its
Members could bring their trade-related competition concerns. Furthermore, the Organisation has a reinforced and
legalised dispute settlement system between governments.
This can back-up agreed rules and provide means for conflict
resolution. 8
In the opinion of the Commission, the WTO dispute settlement
system is useful both for disputes about the legislative implementation of a competition agreement and for disputes about its application in individual cases. With particular regard to the question of dispute settlement procedures, the same Communication
stated:
Apart from its natural role as a permanent forum for negotiation adapting or strengthening agreed rules and obligations,
the WTO also provides a compliance mechanism to help settle disputes between governments when a country claims that
agreed WTO rules have been breached. ... The WTO mechanisms could be applied if a country for example fails to set
up a domestic competition structure or if it fails to react in a
specific case to a request for enforcement action lodged by
another WTO Member. The relevant rules could be adapted,
if necessary, to the specificities of competition law and policy,
and could be applied in a progressive way.'
C. The Position of the United States
In contrast to the European Communities, the United
States is skeptical about the negotiation of a competition agreement within the WTO. This skeptical attitude relates both to
negotiating binding rules and to the application of the WTO dispute settlement system. The United States has a particular aver8. COM (96)284 Final, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comnm/
tion/international/com284.html.
9. Id.

competi-
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sion to the application of the dispute settlement system for reviewing individual national decisions in competition cases. On
November 18, 1996, Joel Klein, then Acting Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust in the United States Department of Justice,
stated in a much quoted speech before the Royal Institute of
International Affairs in London:
On the one hand, in the absence of broadly shared views on
the precise objectives and supporting analysis applicable
under competition laws, the use of dispute resolution with respect to a general requirement that [M]ember [S] tates adopt
and enforce antitrust laws, and also consider requests to investigate from other [S] tates, is likely to have little impact on
trade liberalization, and could in fact give procedural legitimacy to harmful actions masquerading as competition policy.
On the other hand, if dispute settlement were extended to
individual decisions taken by domestic competition authorities, this could interfere with national sovereignty concerning
prosecutorial discretion"' and judicial decision-making, and
could also involve WTO panels in inappropriate reviews of
case specific, highly confidential business information.''
In a later speech delivered in June of 1999, Klein stated that a
review of individual decisions:
[Would] involve the WTO in second-guessing prosecutorial
decision making in complex evidentiary contexts - a task in
which the WTO has no experience and for which it is not
suited - and would inevitably politicize international antitrust enforcement in ways that are not likely to improve either
the economic rationality or the legal neutrality of antitrust
decision making.'"
10. For a demonstration that the exercise of such prosecutorial discretion already
today is bound by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") rules, see infra
text accompanying n.49.
1I.

joel 1. Klein, A Note of Caution with lespect to a WFO Agenda on Competition Policy,

Address Before the Royal Institute of Intern ationalAffairs (Nov, 18, 1996), availableat http://
www.sdoi.gov/atr/public/speeches/ikspch.htm. In the same speech, Klein made the
following remark: "Competition policy ... is often very fact intensive, and to my knowledge no government has proposed turning over to a 'WTO body the kinds of confidential business information typically required for a proper competition analysis in particular cases."
12. Joel 1. Klein, A Reality Check on Antitrust Rules in the World Trade Organization, and a Practical Way Forward on International Antitrust, Address Before the OECD
Conference on Trade and Competition (June 30, 1999), OECD, Trade and Competition Policies: Exploring the Ways Forward (1999).
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The position of the Assistant Attorney General is shared by the
majority of the International Competition Advisory Committee,
a body established by the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. The majority opinion stated:
Various concerns animate the Advisory Committee's skepticism toward competition rules at the WTO, including the pos-

sibility that the quid pro quo nature of WTO negotiations
could distort competition standards; the potential intrusion
of WTO dispute settlement panels into domestic regulatory
practices; and the inappropriateness of obliging countries to
adopt competition laws.' "
In an impressive article, Daniel K. Tarullo gives a detailed
explanation of the motives behind the aversion of U.S. competition policy makers to the WTO. Tarullo points out that the
GATT and its successor organization, the WTO, are devoted to
trade policy. The WTO and its Secretariat are thus dominated
by trade policy makers. Trade policy follows different principles
than competition policy. The objective of trade policy is to open
up markets in the interest of exporters. From a competition policy perspective, it is feared that this interest will prevail in the
WTO, even where existing market access barriers enhance economic efficiency and benefit consumers. From a competition
policy standpoint, such a result is just as undesirable as the introduction of trade policy motivated import restrictions (such as
anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties or other protective
measures), when open market access would enhance economic
efficiency and serve consumer interests. The dominance of
trade policies within the WTO gives rise to the danger that competition policy measures would be "contaminated" by trade policy beliefs. 4 This danger exists both in the negotiation of com13.

UNITED

STATES DE I" OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT, INTERNATIONAL COMI'ETITION

POLICY ADviSORY COMMITrEEU

TO THE AITORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTAN-l- AT-FORNEY GEN-

ANTITRUST 278 (2000).
14. Ignacio Garcia Bercero and Stefan D. Amarasinha have taken issue with this
position, stressing that the world trading order is not about guaranteeing market access
but ahout providing for equal competitive opportunities, so that both trade and competition policies play a complementary role in promoting the contestability of markets.
See lgnacio Garcia Bercero & Stefan D. Amarasinha, Moving the Trade and Competition
Debate Forward, 4J. INT'L ECON. L. 481, 501-02 (2001), relying on Edward M. Graham,
The Relationship Between International Trade Policy and Competition Policy, in GLOBALIZATION
UNDER THRIr Sec. 2 (Zdenek Drabek ed., 2001), available at http://vww.wto.org/english/rese/rese/graham.doc. See also MANISDEN, supra n.2, at 125-29.
ERAL

FOR
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petition rules and in the enforcement of their application.
Tarullo further points out that trade policy rules traditionally
tend to be rather detailed and usually prohibit certain behavior
by signatory States. Competition policy rules, in contrast, are rel15
atively broad and require certain action by signatory States.
Tarullo finally draws attention to the fact that the dispute settlement system of the WTO is increasingly characterized by an atmosphere of conflict. Rather than conflicts, a successful conduct of competition policies at the international level requires
that competition authorities cooperate in a spirit of mutual trust.
Such cooperation would be impaired by the application of the
WTO dispute settlement system.'
D. Evolution of the Position of the European Commission Under the
Influence of the United States' Negative Attitude
The United States' negative attitude had a significant influence on the position of the European Communities. This evolution is apparent in three documents published in 1999. An internal discussion paper of the Commission states that "the basic
function of dispute settlement would be to ensure that domestic
competition law and enforcement structures are in accordance
with the provisions agreed multilaterally."' 7 The discussion paper continues:
A more difficult and controversial issue is whether WTO dispute settlement could apply to a review of decisions taken by
competition authorities in individual cases .... An option that
could be explored is the establishment of a panel to consider
alleged patterns of failure to enforce competition law to cases
affecting the trade and investment of other W'TO Members.
...In any event there will be no review of individual decisions. "
In a Communication to the Council and the European Parlia15. On the question of whether this claim can properly be made, see inf/ra Sec. VI

in fine.

16. Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J.
L. 478, 478-504 (2000). For a comment on some of these critical remarks, see infra
Sec. VIII(A).
17. Discussion Paper, Trade and Competition 5 (Mat. 19, 1999), available at http:/
/eu ropa.eu.int/comn/competition/international.
18. Id. at 12; see aLso WTO, Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and
competition Policy, Communication from the European Ciommunity and itsMember States,
WAT/WGTCP/W/160, at 3 (Mar, 14, 2001).
INT'L
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ment of 1999, the Commission recommends the same line, but
does not take up the previously mentioned option of reviewing
patterns of competition law misapplication.'" A 1999 communication of the European Communities and their Member States
to the WTO Competition Working Group does not even men21
tion dispute settlement. 1
It is remarkable that

as it appears

-

the issue of applying

-

the WTO dispute settlement system to a new WTO competition
agreement has not been discussed at all, or not in much detail,
in the annual reports of the Working Group on the Interaction
Between Trade and Competition Policy. 2 ' These reports reflect
that several proponents of a WTO competition agreement fore-

see at most a limited role for the dispute settlement system in
this field and that this system should, in any case, not apply to
22
individual decisions.
IV. THE SITUATION DE LEGE LATA
The behavior of the European Communities is understanda-

ble, in the light of the U.S. resistance in particular and the state
of the multilateral trading system after Seattle in general. It is
probably motivated - at least in part by considerations of
negotiation strategy. We do not know whether the European

Communities have fundamentally changed their position and
19. Communication fiom the Commission to the Council and to the European
Parliament, The EU Approach to the Millennium Round, COM (99) 0331 Final. See also
Bercero & Amarasinha, sup/ra n.14, at 494.
20.
TO, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Communication from the Eurolean Community an(d its Member States, WT/IA/WGTCP/
W/115 (May 25, 1999).
21. See WTO, REPORT (1997) OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERAcTION BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETrION POL ICY- T0 1IF GENERAL COUNCIL,
rWT/WGTCP/l (No-

vember 28, 1997); WTO,

REPORI

(1998)

BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPIETITION

(Dec. 8, 1998); WIO,

oF T1E WORKING GROUP ON TI-E INTERACTION

POLICY -10 TIlE GENERAL COUNCIL,

REPORT (1999)

WT/WGTCP/2

OF THE WORKING GROUP ON T-E INTERACTION

BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION POLI- TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL, WT/WGTCP/3
(Oct. 11, 1999), para. 79; "TO, REPORT (2000) 01 TIlE WORKING GROUP ON TIlE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETrrIoN POLICN, TO -TiE GENERAL COUNCIL,
IT/
WGTCP/4 (Nov. 30, 2000), at para. 79; WTO, REPORT (2001) OF TIlE WORKING. GROUP
ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE AND COIPFTITION POLICY TO THE GENERAL COUN-

CIL, WT/WGTCP/5 (Oct. 8, 2001), at paras. 87-91.
22. WTO, REPORT (2001) OF TH-E WORKING GROUP

ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN

sulpra n.21, at para. 87; see
also WTO, REPORT (1999) oF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE
AND COMPETrrION Policy to the General Council, supra n.21, at para. 79.
TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY TO THE GENFRAI

COUNCIL,
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have lost their interest in the application of the WTO dispute
settlement system in principle. It is therefore worthwhile to examine the extent to which it is already possible to invoke the
dispute settlement system in order to review the compatibility of
national competition laws and their application with existing
WTO law.
V. THE THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMPLAINTS
UNDER THE GA77
The WTO dispute settlement system applies to all WTO
agreements, in particular to the GATT 1994. According to Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 (which applies by reference to
most other WTO agreements), a successful complaint depends
on the nullification or impairment of a benefit accruing to the
complaining Member directly or indirectly under the GATT
1994 or the impediment of the attainment of any objective of the
GATT 1994. This requirement can be met in the following three
ways set out in Article XXIII:I of the GATT 1994:
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement (so-called violation complaint); or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
Agreement (so-called non-violation complaint); or
(c) the existence of any other situation (so-called situation
complaint).
This Article focuses on the first of these possibilities, i.e., the socalled violation complaint. As was already the case under the old
GATT, violation complaints in practice play a much greater role
than non-violation complaints. Additionally, several violation
complaints have had links to competition related issues.2 Nevertheless, we will briefly return to the non-violation complaint
towards the end of this Article for the following simple reason:
in the short history of the WTO, there has been one (unsuccessful) non-violation complaint with strong links to competition
law. In contrast, a situation complaint never became the object
23. For examples of violation claims, see e.g.,
SUMER PHOTOGR'Ic

[hereinafterJAPAN

-

MEASUREs AFFEMrING. CON-

WrT/DS161/R, AV/DS169/R, and
WT/DS161/AB/R, "WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000).

FRESH, CHILLED ANn FROZEN BEEF, PANlEL RiPORT,

APPELLATE BooY

JAPAN -

FILM AND PAPER, PANEl. RE.PORi WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998)
FII.M PANEL REPORT]; KOREA - MEASURES AFFECIING IMPORTS OF

REi.PORT,
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of a panel or Appellate Body report.

4

VI. THE REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAWS AS SUCH
It is well known that the GATT 1994, which is an integral
part of the WTO Agreement, is based on two principles of nondiscrimination. These are the principle of most-favored-nation
treatment and the principle of national treatment of imported
goods. The GATT 1994 and, more generally, the WTO Agreement, are based on other fundamental principles, such as transparency, but for the sake of simplicity, this Article focuses on the
principle of national treatment.2" This principle is also likely to
have the greatest practical relevance. As an illustration, it suffices to recall the occasional reproach that national competition
law is applied more strictly to foreign competitors than to domestic ones.
The same principle applies to services, according to Article
XVII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"),
and to intellectual property protection, according to Article 3 of
the TRIPS Agreement. Article XVII of the GATS, however, only
applies when and in so far as a WTO Member has made market
access commitments, and in its schedule that Member may have
subjected it to limitations. For the sake of brevity and simplicity,
Article XVII of the GATS and Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement
will not be addressed separately in this Article. Mutatis mutandis,
the statements about Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994 also apply to
those provisions.
Article 111:4, first sentence, of the GATT 1994 provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party [Member] imported into the territory of any other contracting
party [Member] shall be accorded treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
24. This non-violation dispute is JAPAN-FILM PANEL REPORT, supra n.23. With regard to the potential role of situation complaints, see infra Sec. XI.
25. For a detailed discussion of the three mentioned principles in the previous
practice of the GATT and the WTO, see WTO, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, The Fundamental WI'O Principles of National Treatment, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and Transparency, Background Note by the Secretariat, WT'/WGTCP/W/1 14 (Apr. 14, 1999).
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There can be no doubt that a piece of national competition
legislation belongs to those provisions that have to comply with
Article 111:4 of the GATT. A national competition act falls within
the category of "laws, regulations and requirements affecting
(the) internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use" of goods. A different opinion would be possible only if the verb "affecting" were to be interpreted narrowly,
which, however, is not the case. Already the panel in the case of
Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery
found that, due to the verb "affecting", Article 111:4 covers "any
laws or regulations which might adversely modify the conditions
of competition" of imports." The recent Appellate Body Report
in the second dispute about the tax treatment of Foreign Sales
Corporations confirms this proposition: the word "affecting" in
Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994 has "a broad scope of application.'"

Since Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994 expressly applies only
to governmental treatment accorded in respect of "laws, regulations and requirements", it would not seem to be a possible yardstick of legal scrutiny wherever competition rules are completely
non-existent.
It is not overly likely," s yet certainly not impossible, that
competition laws as such will be scrutinized under Article 111:4
and will not pass this scrutiny. There are several reasons for this.
First, there will hardly be any competition laws which, as such,
treat imports less favorably than like domestic goods, be it dejure
or defacto. This is especially true if the competition law at issue
applies to all products, whatever their nature, whatever their origin. Such a law could only violate Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994
in a case where imports must be treated differently from like
26. 1TALIAN DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMI'ORTED AGRICULTUIRAL MACHINERY, PANEL
B.I.S.D. 7S/60, at para. 12 (Oct. 23, 1958). GATT panel reports are availableat
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/gt47ds e.htm.
27. UNITED STATES - TAx TREATMENT FOR "FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS" - RECOURSE To ARTICLE 21.5 OF TIHE DSU iw TItE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, APPFLLATE BODY
REtPowR, ArT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002), at paras. 209-10, referring to EUROIEAN
COMMUNITIES - REGIME. FOR THE IMPORTATION, SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF BANANAS, APPELLATE BODY REPORr, WT/DS27/AB/R (September 25, 1997), para. 220 [hereinafter
REPORT,

EC - BANANAS III APPELLATE BODY REPORT] and CANADA - CERTAIN MEASURES AFFECTING
TIE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY, APviELLAVI1 BODY REPORT, WT/DS139/AB/R, W'T/DS142/

AB/R, Uune 19, 2000), at para. 150.

28. See also Bercero & Amarasinha, supra n.14, at 494.
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domestic goods in order to afford both equally favorable treatment."9 As convincing as this basic understanding of the national treatment obligation might be, it is difficult to apply this
aspect in practice. Accordingly, the exact scope of the prohibition of this kind of defacto discrimination is yet to be clarified."'
Conversely, it is not impossible that the case will be made that,
due to the particular structures of a particular market, the application of the same standards to imports and to like domestic
products accords to the latter less favorable treatment.
It may also be, and this is more likely, that there are special
laws, or sub-legislative regulations which apply only to a certain
category of products (of whatever origin), for instance (block)
exemptions. If, as a result, there is a difference in the treatment
of some imports (those not falling under the exemption) and
some like domestic goods (those covered by the exemption) and
this difference is simultaneously a competitive disadvantage for
the excluded imports, there may be a breach of Article 111:4 of
the GATT 1994. Whether such a regime violates the national
treatment obligation will depend on whether the mere differentiation is sufficient or whether there has to be a disadvantage for
like imports, those covered and those not covered by the block
exemption, taken together, compared with like domestic goods,
taken together. This question is yet to be resolved with final clarity in the WTO jurisprudence.-"1
An instance of de jure discrimination would, of course, exist
where access to competition law is limited to domestic firms"2 or
29. See UNITED STATES - SECTION 337 oF TH-E TARIFF Ac.I- OF 1930, PANEL REPORT,
B.I.S.D. 36S/345 (Nov. 7, 1989), at para. 5.11. The European Communities have proposed to limit the national treatment obligation of a future competition agreement to
outlawing de jure discrimination and to apply it only to the competition law framework
of a Member. See Communication fiom the European Communities and Its Member
States, A Multilateral Framework Agreement on Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/
152, at 6 (Sept. 25, 2000). To avoid a possible misunderstanding, it should therefore be
emphasized that defacto discrimination can be found not only in the manner in which
the administrative authorities apply a piece of competition law, but also in the law itself.
30. See Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in WFO Law: National and Most-Favoared-Nation Treatment - or Equal Treatment?, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921, at 925, n.10
(2002). It must be remembered that the legal order of the GATT, with just a few hundred dispute settlement decisions to date (including decisions reached under the
GATT 1947), is a very young legal order and many fundamental questions have yet to
be resolved.
31. See id. at 921-48.
32. See Organization fot Economic Cooperation and Development, Competition Ele-
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where an exemption from competition law differentiates according to the origin of the products in a way that is detrimental to
like imports. It has, for example, been argued that the exemption of export cartels from the prohibition of restrictive business
practices is a violation of national treatment:"
Where a piece of competition legislation exceptionally (and
potentially) affords like imports less favorable treatment, this
treatment might not be mandatory, but be left to the discretion
of the competent authorities. In such a case, one would apply
the traditional GATT doctrine of distinguishing between
mandatory and discretionary laws. Only mandatory legislation
can, in principle, be challenged successfully as being GATT-inconsistent as such. 4 In contrast, in the case of non-mandatory
(discretionary) legislation, the complainant must wait for an instance of GATT-inconsistent application. 5 The traditional
GATT practice relies on the presumption that States comply with
their international obligations in good faith and will avoid behavior that violates international law. Many national legal systems also contain an unwritten principle of legal interpretation,
according to which

-

to the extent possible -

national law is to

be interpreted in accordance with international legal obligations. Within some limits, this part of national law is also to be
taken into account. One could, however, also draw the distincments in InternationalTrade Agreements: A Post-Uruguay Round Overview of WJ'O Agreements,
COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, at 11 Uan. 28, 1999).
33. It is debatable whether such an exemption violates the national treatment obligation. Imports, which do not enjoy the exemption, are obviously treated less favorably
than the exempted exports. One can, therefore, not rule out the relevance of national
treatment with the argument that this obligation only concerns imports and not exports
(as it is being ruled out in the WTO's Special Study on Trade and Competition Policy, in
WTO, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 64 (1997)). The question, however, is whether the analysis
of less favorable treatment correctly consists in a comparison of the treatment of imports with (among other things) the treatment of like exports or whether imports must
be compared solely with the domestic goods destined for the domestic market. We do
not intend to resolve this question here. On this question, see Ehring, supra n.30, at
n.235.
34. Ultimately, it depends on the NAITO provision in question, whether it precludes
only mandatory inconsistent laws or also discretionary ones. SEE U.S. - 1974 SECTION
301 PANEL REPORT, supra n.7, at paras. 7.53-7.54.
35. UNITED STATES - ANTI-DuMPING Acir OF 1916, APPEI LATE BODY REPORT, WTI
DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000), at paras. 88-89, with reference to
UNITED STATES MEASURES AFFEFrING THE IMPORTATION, INTERNAL SALE AND USE OF ToBACCO, PANEL REPORT, B.I.S.D. 41S/1/131 (Oct. 4, 1994) and several other older GATT
'CrION 211 OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS AcT O1
Panel Reports. See also UNITED STATES - SE(
1998, APPEILATE BODY REPORT, 'AT/DSI76/AB/R (February 1, 2002), para. 259.
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tion somewhat differently and accept as WTO-compatible only
discretionary legislation which, while not excluding that imports
receive less favorable treatment, does not, in itself, include any
such less favorable treatment for imports. That would be the
case, for instance, where the law prescribes a certain treatment
for domestic goods, but leaves it to the administrative institutions applying the law to treat imports as favorably or less favora36
bly.
For the reasons outlined above, in the event of a complaint
against a norm that is mandatory but leaves room for various
interpretations, both a panel and the Appellate Body are likely
to accept an interpretation that is favorable to WTO law. In
other words, they are likely to accept an interpretation that is
consistent with the obligations of the responding Member. 7
As a preliminary result we can summarize: competition laws
of W'TO Members are currently subject to the dispute settlement
system. The national treatment obligation prescribed by Article
111:4 of the GATT 1994 is probably the most important test. It is
not likely, yet not impossible, that a competition law per se violates Article III:4.
A competition agreement to be negotiated within the WTO
would significantly increase the number of legal requirements to
which national competition laws are subject. Such an agreement
would probably also contain express obligations as to the introduction of competition laws. These obligations would go beyond those that, already today and at least implicitly, can be derived from individual special provisions of the WTO agreements.
For instance, such an obligation can be derived from Article VIII
of the GATS, which states:
1. Each Member shall ensure that any monopoly supplier of
a service in its territory does not, in the supply of the monop-

oly service in the relevant market, act in a manner inconsis36. In that case, discretion would exist only on the one side of the spectrum, that
is, for imports and it would exist only in the one direction of worse treatment. Hence,
the law itself is less favorable (due to the legal possibility of worse treatment) for imports than it is for domestic goods (which do not risk the same kind of worse treatnent),
37. See UNITED STATES - ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN HoT-ROLLED STEEL
PRoDucrs FROM JAPAN, APPEL[ATE BOo', REPORT, WT/DSI84/AB/R (July 24, 2001), at
paras. 200-08 [hereinafter UNITED STATES - HoT-ROLLED STEEL APPELLATE Bony REPORT].
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tent with that Member's obligations under Article II and specific commitments.
2. Where a Member's monopoly supplier competes, either directly or through an affiliated company, in the supply of a
service outside the scope of its monopoly rights and which is
subject to that Member's specific commitments, the Member
shall ensure that such a supplier does not abuse its monopoly
position to act in its territory in a manner inconsistent with
such commitments....
5. The provisions of this article shall also apply to cases of
exclusive service suppliers, where a Member, formally or in
effect, (a) authorizes or establishes a small number of service
suppliers and (b) substantially prevents competition among
those suppliers in its territory.
In addition to Article VIII of the GATS, 5 the Telecommunications Annex to the GATS requires that service providers in
other Members be given access to public telecommunications
networks on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. The
Telecommunications Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles
further provides for certain "competitive safeguards." Under the
terms of the Reference Paper, the WTO Members who signed it
are obliged to maintain "[a]ppropriate measures ...for the purpose of preventing ...major suppliers from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices."'" Members must also ensure
interconnection with major suppliers under non-discriminatory
terms, in a timely manner, on transparent, reasonable, cost-oriented and unbundled terms.4" The "appropriate measures" that
Members must maintain arguably include both the enactment of
competition laws and their enforcement in individual cases.
In 2000, the United States brought against Mexico the first
complaint under the Reference Paper. 4' After lengthy consultations between the parties, the panel in this dispute was established on April 17, 2002. At the request of the United States, the
38. For an example of a dispute relating to Article VIII of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services ("GATS"), see Request for Consultations by the United States on
Belgium - Measures Afecting Commercial 7elephone Directory Services, WAT/DS80/1 (May 13,
1997).
39. Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Reference Paper, at para
1.1 (Apr. 24, 1996), availableat http://www.wto.oig/english/news_e/pies97_e/refpap_
e.htm.
40. Id. at para. 2.
41. Request for Consultations by the United States in Mexico - Measures Aflfecitng
Telecommunications Secvices, NAT/DS/204/1 (Aug. 17, 2000).
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Director-General of the WITO composed the panel on August 26,
2002, because the parties were unable to agree on the selection
of panel members.4" The United States alleges that Mexico violated its GATS obligations resulting from the Annex on Telecommunications and the Reference Paper. The dispute raises
questions of access to public telecommunications networks and
discrimination against foreign services suppliers. It involves the
examination of the position and conduct of a commercial operator, Telmex, and the alleged failure of Mexico to enforce competitive safeguards. At the time of writing, the United States had
just filed its first written submission to the Panel," so that a ruling can be expected around mid-2003.
Beyond Article VIII and the Reference Paper, the GATS also
addresses restrictive business practices of non-monopoly service
suppliers. Article IX states:
1. Members recognize that certain business practices of service suppliers, other than those falling under Article VIII,
may restrain competition and thereby restrict trade in services.
2. Each Member shall, at the request of any other Member,
enter into consultations with a view to eliminating practices
referred to in paragraph 1. The Member addressed shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to such a request and
shall cooperate.
Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement not only allows Members
to enact laws against the anti-competitive abuse of licenses on
intellectual property rights. It also obliges Members to enter
into consultations with any other Member which believes that its
competition laws are being infringed by the licensing practices
of a foreign intellectual property right owner.
The thesis that trade policy chiefly deals with negative
prohibitions directed at Members, and not with positive obligations to take action,4 4 is no longer tenable since the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round. The TRIPS Agreement is the best example of a host of far-reaching positive obligations to take action,
42. Note by the Secretariat on Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommnications Services,
'ATI/DS204 (Oct. 3, 2002).
43. Available at http://ustr.gov/enforcement/biiefs.shtml.
44. See Tarull,

supra n.16, at 489. See also su/)ra n. 15 and accompanying text.
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that are likely to exceed by far what can be expected from a competition agreement even under a best case scenario.
It is interesting to note that Article 1501 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") sets out the obligation
"to proscribe anti-competitive business conduct and to take appropriate action" in that respect. However, Article 1501 (3) expressly excludes these obligations of Article 1501 from the scope
of application of NAFTA dispute settlement. For monopolies
and State enterprises, Articles 1502 and 1503 contain more specific obligations aiming to ensure that other NAFTA obligations
are not undermined. Under Article 1116, an investor is also able
to invoke certain provisions of Articles 1502 and 1503 in an arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, as it is currently the case in
the Arbitration, United Parcel Service (UPS) vs. Canada (award on
jurisdiction rendered on November 22, 2002). In this competition related dispute, UPS also alleges that the Canadian government violated the national treatment obligation under Article
1102, given the treatment accorded to Canada Post.
VII. THE REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL COMPETITIONDECISIONS
More interesting and complicated than the question of the
review of competition laws as such is the issue of reviewing the
behavior of competition authorities in individual cases. In other
words, are WTO Members already subject to the WATO dispute
settlement system in their application of competition laws and, if
so, to what extent?
For the reasons outlined above,4 the starting point of the
analysis should again be Article 111:4 of the GATT. The national
treatment obligation of Article 111:4 expressly applies to "laws,
regulations and requirements." Individual decisions of competition authorities can fall under the concept of "requirements."
The Appellate Body has so far not had opportunity to express
itself on the interpretation of this term. At least one panel report clearly expressed itself in favor of understanding individual
decisions as falling within that category. The report, Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, states with regard to undertakings that have been made by foreign investors
in individual cases and accepted by the Canadian authorities:
45. See supra Sec. VI.
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5.4 ... The Panel ... noted that written purchase undertakings - leaving aside the manner in which they may have been
arrived at (voluntary submissions, encouragements, negotiation, etc.) - once they were accepted, became part of the conditions under which the investment proposals were approved,
in which case compliance could legally be enforced. The
Panel therefore found that the word "requirements" as used
in Article 111:4 could be considered a proper description of
existing undertakings.
5.5. The Panel could not subscribe to the Canadian view that
the word "requirements" in Article 111:4 should be interpreted as "mandatory rules applying across he board" because
this latter concept was already more aptly covered by the term
"regulations" and the authors of this provision must have
had
something different in mind when adding the word "requirements." The mere fact that the few disputes that have so far
been brought before the contracting parties regarding the
application of Article 111:4 have only concerned laws and regulations does not in the view of the Panel justify an assimilation of "requirements" with "regulations." The Panel also
considered that, in judging whether a measure is contrary to
obligations under Article 111:4, it is not relevant whether it
applies across the board or only in isolated cases. Any interpretation which would exclude case-by-case action would, in
the view of the Panel, defeat the purposes of Article 111:4. 4"
In addition to these considerations as to whether individual
decisions by competition authorities can be qualified as "requirements", it should be pointed out that Article 111:4 does not prohibit less favorable treatment "in" or "through laws, regulations
and requirements", but "in respect of all laws regulations and requirements." It would seem plausible to hold that the application of a law qualifies as "treatment ... in respect of" that law.
Individual competition decisions can be made by the executive or by courts. Decisions by administrative authorities are typical in Europe, whereas in the United States such decisions are
left to the courts. For the application of Article 111:4, this distinction is irrelevant. Despite the fact that judiciaries are usually in46.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW Am-" (FIRA),
B.I.S.D. 30S/140 (Feb. 7, 1984). See also EEC - REGULXrIONS OF IMPORTS OF PARTS AND COMPONENIS, PANELt REiPORT, B.I.S.D. 37/132 (May 16, 1990). Article XXVIII:(a) of the CATS defines the term "measure" as follows: "'measure' means
any measure by a Member, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure,
decision, administrative action, or any other form."
CANADA -

PANEL REPORT,
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dependent in countries living under the rule of law, States are
responsible for the acts of their courts as they are responsible for
the actions taken by their administrative authorities.
The distinction between the European and U.S. decision
structures would be eliminated if a WTO dispute settlement procedure could be initiated only after exhausting domestic remedies. However, such a requirement does not exist in WTO law as
a matter of positive law. A Member may bring a case to the dispute settlement system in the event of any breach of the WTO
Agreement (and the then presumed nullification or impairment
of a benefit). This main condition of a violation of WTO law is
satisfied as soon as the legislature or the executive acts inconsistently with the Member's WTO obligations. Accordingly, in the
dispute settlement practice to date, no report has made the exhaustion of domestic remedies a prerequisite. Such a prerequisite would also be at odds with the principle of prompt settlement of disputes, which is expressed by the short deadlines
under which panels and the Appellate Body, as well as the DSB
in its adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports, operate.4 7
Article 111:4, one may think, applies only when a competition authority or a court has made a decision, not if they have
failed to act. This obviously appears to impose a limit on the
enforcement of the national treatment obligation in competition law. A legal assessment of the supervisory activity of a national competition authority depends on a review not only of the
decisions made, but also of the decisions that have not been
made. In other words, competition law can be breached by a
competition authority through action as well as through inaction. An excessive penalty on a certain cartel is, from a legal
point of view, as problematic as the failure to prosecute a similarly illegal other cartel. Despite the mentioned limitation of Article 111:4, it would go too far to suggest that, as a matter of principle, instances of inaction by competition authorities cannot be
inconsistent with the national treatment obligation: only complete inaction would appear not to qualify as "treatment" in the
sense of Article 111:4, There is no such complete inaction, and
47. SeeUnderstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LE;AL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU], arts. 3.3,12, 17, 20
and 21.
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there can be less favorable governmental treatment, where the
competition authorities have taken no action in one case but
have acted so in another, similar case.
More serious is another limit to the application of Article
111:4 to individual decisions. A violation of Article 111:4 requires
proof that imported goods are treated less favorably than like
domestic goods. Such proof will exist when a competition authority adopts different decisions with regard to two agreements
relating to like goods. For instance, the competition authority
could authorize an exclusive retail system to the benefit of a domestic producer, whilst prohibiting a similar exclusive retail system for like imported goods. To take another example, the
competition authority could refrain from intervening against a
buying cartel that refuses to purchase imports, thereby departing
from that authority's usual practice with regard to buying cartels
that harm domestic products.4" This makes clear that the national treatment obligation, as a matter of principle, limits the
prosecutorial discretion which some competition authorities enjoy." It is easy to find hypothetical examples, but in practice it
may well be difficult to prove that there has been a violation of
the national treatment obligation. The application of Article
111:4 to individual decisions of competition authorities will therefore, in practice, remain the exception. In addition, where individual decisions by competition authorities contravene Article 111:4, the Member concerned may invoke Article XX(d) as a
justification. 50 Lastly, due to resource constraints and political
reasons for a certain selectivity, Member governments (which
are the only ones able to bring a complaint to the WTO) may be
reluctant to invoke the dispute settlement system because of an
individual decision, and rather prioritize disputes relating to
48. Mitsuo Matsushita, Restrictive Business Practices and the WI'O/GAYF Dispute Settlement Process, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LA W AND THE GATT/IWTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SVSTEM 357, 370 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997).
49. Anderson & Holmes, supra n.2, at 533. See also supra Sec. III.C.
50. Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 allows Members to derogate from GATT obligations when they adopt measures "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement," "[s]ubject to

the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." It is hence
necessary that the competition law to be enforced be in itself non-discriminatory, but
also that the individual measure be "necessary." This is not the case where less discriminatory conduct would equally achieve the objective pursued.
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breaches of WTO law affecting more than one economic actor. 5'
This, however, does not detract from the principle that, already
today, the WTO dispute settlement system applies to individual
decisions in the area of competition law.
Some critical observers may disagree with one or the other
aspect of the above interpretation of Article 111:4 of the GATT.
However, they cannot deny that, for example, Article VIII of the
GATS demands individual actions in competition cases and that
disputes about compliance with this Article are subject to the
WTO dispute settlement system.
In addition to Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994, other existing
provisions of WTO law may be relevant to the conduct of national competition authorities in individual cases. For example,
Article 11.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards provides that
"Members shall not encourage or support the adoption or maintenance" of non-governmental measures equivalent to a voluntary import or export restraint. In other words, Article 11.3 prohibits governmental encouragement and support of import or
export cartels. It has been suggested in the literature that the
terms "encourage or support" could be interpreted broadly so as
to cover the non-application of existing anti-cartel legislation,5 2
and that Article 11.3 could be the basis for building a jurisprudence relating to restrictive business practices.5" From a textual
point of view, "support" seems to mean more than just "tolerate." 4 On the other hand, one may argue that the intentional
non-application of competition laws that would normally (have
to) be applied can be a strong form of support. It has also been
suggested that the authorization of import cartels as it exists in
some national competition legislation could qualify as a positive
contribution to a restrictive business practice because it brings
51. Due to the economic importance of certain companies, their access to the political power or their readiness to bear the costs of a WTO dispute, there are undoubtedly exceptions to this rule.
52. Frieder Roessler, The Concept of Nullification and Impairment in the Legal System of
the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL. TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DisPUTE SITrLE.MFNT SYsrEM 123, 140 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997); Frieder Roessler, Should Principles of Competition Policy be Incorporatedinto WIT Law Through Non-Violation Complaints?, 2J. INI'rL ECON. L. 413, 421 (1999).
53. Roessler, Should Principles of Competition Policy Be Incorporated into Wl0 Law
Through Non-Violation Complaints?, supra n.52, at 421.
54. See also Matsushita, supra n.48, at 369 ("too remote a linkage with any governmental action"); Marsden, supra n.2, at 144.
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that practice about.5 5 It is again the question whether a legislative exemption (possibly coupled with an approval requirement)
56
suffices for satisfying the condition "encourage or support.
This question does not arise in the event of informal governmental guidance or suggestion, as this is precisely the kind of governmental contribution that the words "encourage or support" contemplate.5 7
The result is clear: under the current framework, both the
competition laws of WTO Members and the application of those
laws in individual cases are subject to the WTO dispute settlement system. Extending this dispute settlement system to a binding competition agreement to be negotiated within the WTO
would, therefore, be no qualitative novum. However, in quantitative terms, such an agreement would significantly extend the obligations of WTO Members in the area of competition and the
scope of the WTO dispute settlement system.
This section has focused on WTO obligations relating to the
area of competition where the government plays no other role
than supervising private competitors. It is clear that where the
government's role has a different quality, additional WTO obligations can become relevant. For instance, a government's positive contribution 58 to anti-competitive behavior amounts to a violation of Article XI: I of the GATT 1994 and possibly Article 11 of
the Agreement on Safeguards where this behavior has the effect
of restricting imports or exports. In other cases, such contribution can violate the national treatment obligation. Pursuant to
Article 3.4 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
Members must not encourage private testing and certification
organizations to discriminate against foreign products. Where
the government itself becomes the economic operator having
exclusive import or export rights, Article XVII of the GATT 1994
mandates the respect of the GATT's non-discrimination disciplines and transactions to be made "solely in accordance with
commercial considerations." Finally, the grant of monopoly
55. Id. at 368.
56. One may argue that a legislative exemption is no more a positive contribution
("encourage or support" arguably require a positive contribution) than an administrative inaction where the law does prohibit the cartel. See, however, id. at 368-69.
57. Id. at 368-69.
58. Id. at 368 (using the term "precipitation").
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rights can contravene the national treatment obligation where
the monopoly is bestowed on a domestic operator.
VIII. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. General Remarks
At least in developed legal systems, decisions in the field of
competition are made in administrative and/or judicial proceedings that ensure not only an optimal clarification of the facts and
the law, but also procedural fairness. Does the WTO dispute settlement system allow for an appropriate international review of
such national proceedings? Or is the dispute settlement system
unable to serve the purpose of such review?
Competition law is part of economic law. As such, it demands not only special legal expertise, but also a good understanding of the economic context and of economics as a discipline. The arguments derived from these facts are well known
by all those who follow the current debate about the modernization and decentralization of the competition law of the European Communities. The dispute settlement system need not
fear these arguments, given that competition disputes panels,
which are responsible for establishing the facts of a case, could
be composed of experts who are familiar with the questions arising in competition law.5 ' The current panel system may well be
problematic in many regards,"' but the flexibility in the selection
of panelists allows for a tailor-made panel of experts in the respective area of a given dispute. The above-mentioned objection
about the risk of "contamination" by trade policy considerations 1 can therefore easily be refuted. A future WTO competition agreement could also expressly provide for the selection of
panelists to ensure that panels have the relevant specific expertise." Finally, it should be recalled that panels can resort to experts."
59. DSU, supra n.47, art. 8.
60. See infra Sec. IX.G.
61. See supra Sec. III.C.
62. Such as provided in the Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement Procedures Jbr the
GeneralAgreement on lTrade in Services and in paragraph 4 of the GATS Annex on Finan-

cial Services.
63. Article 13.2 of the DSU gives every Panel the right to seek expert advice. In the
past, panels confined themselves to consulting experts about scientific questions. Nevertheless, nothing prevents a panel froin hearing experts on economic questions, in

2003] WTO DISPUTE SE7TLEMENT AND COMPETITIONLAW1533
Competition decisions are not the only instances in which
an optimal exploration of the facts must be reconciled with procedural fairness. Similar problems arise in procedures about
safeguard measures or anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
In all these procedures, the problem to be solved at the level of
WTO dispute settlement is the same. On the one hand, it would
be inept to repeat the entire investigation that has been conducted by the national authorities and/or courts. For a number
of reasons, a WTO panel would not even be in the position to do
so. On the other hand, it would be highly unsatisfactory if a
W'TO panel were to review only compliance with purely formal,
procedural aspects in the national investigation procedure. The
optimal standard of review therefore has to be positioned between these two extremes.
B. The General Standard of Review of Article 11 of the DSU
Relatively early on, in the well-known Hormones Report, the
Appellate Body stated that a panel's standard of review is generally stipulated by Article IlI of the DSU." 4 The relevant part
states: "a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the
case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
covered agreements. ''" 5 The only apparent exception to this
principle is Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, discussed below.
Subsequently to the Hormones Report, a number of Appellate Body Reports further clarified and refined the standard of
review for complex fact-finding exercises in domestic investigations. The starting point is the following passage from the Hormones Report:

[The] applicable standard is neither de novo review as such,
nor "total deference," but rather the "objective assessment of
the facts." Many panels have in the past refused to undertake
particular with regard to events that are relevant from a competition law perspective.
Also for this reason, the argument of threatening "contamination" by trade policy
mentalities is unlustified.
64. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - MEASURES CONCERNING MEAT AND MEAT PRODUCrs
(HORMONES), APPELLATE BODY RiPORT, WT/DS26 and 'NT/DS48 (Feb. 13, 1998), at
paras.

115-17 [hereinafter EC

-

HORMON-S APPLI ATE BODY REPORT].

65. DSU, supra n.47, art. 11, reprinted in EC n.64, at para. 116.

Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra
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de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a
review. On the other hand, "total deference to the findings
of the national authorities," it has been well said, "could not
ensure an 'objective assessment'" as foreseen by Article 11 of
the DSU. 66
The Appellate Body Report in Argentina - Footwear states with
regard to the investigative obligations of national authorities
under Article 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards:
To determine whether the safeguard investigation and the resulting safeguard measure applied by Argentina were consistent with Article 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the Panel
was obliged, by the very terms of Article 4, to assess whether
the Argentine authorities had examined all the relevant facts
of how the facts
and had provided a reasoned explanation
7
supported their determination.3
In United States - Wheat Gluten, the Appellate Body had the
opportunity to refine the national authorities' investigative obligations in safeguard cases and thereby to further clarify the
panels' standard of review. According to the Appellate Body, Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards require national
authorities to look for relevant information ex officio:
If the competent authorities consider that a particular, "other
factor" may be relevant to the situation of the domestic industry ... their duties of investigation and evaluation preclude
them from remaining passive in the face of possible shortcomings in the evidence submitted, and views expressed, by
the interested parties. In such cases, where the competent
authorities do not have sufficient information before them to
evaluate the possible relevance of such an "other factor", they
must investigate fully that "other factor", so that they can fulfil their obligations of evaluation . . . Therefore, the competent authorities must undertake additional investigative steps,
when the circumstances so require, in order to fulfil their obligation to evaluate all relevant factors.'
66. EC - HORMONES AipE.,VxiF BOr'"REPORT, Sulfa n.64, at para. 117,
ence to previous panel reports.
67.

ARGENTINA

-

SAFEGUARD

MFASURFS ON

IMPORTS

with

refer-

OF FOOTIWEAR, APPELIATE

BOry REPORT, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999), at para. 121.

68.

UNITFD STATES -

DEFINITIVE SAFEGUARD ME SURES ON IMPORTS OF WHEAT GLU-

TEN FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

APPELILATE BoiY REPORT, IAT/DS166/AB/R
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The most precise description of the standard of the review
of determinations made by national authorities in safeguard proceedings is found in the Appellate Body Report in United States
- Lamb Meal. The starting point is the following statement:
First, a panel must review whether competent authorities
have evaluated all relevant factors, and, second, a panel must
review whether the authorities have provided a reasoned and
adequate explanation of how the facts support their determination. Thus, the panel's objective assessment involves a formal
aspect and a substantive aspect. The formal aspect is whether
the competent authorities have evaluated "all relevant factors." The substantive aspect is whether the competent authorities have given a reasoned and adequate explanation for
their determination.
The Report, however, continues:
We wish to emphasize that, although panels are not entitled
to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute
their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities,
this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. To the contrary, . . . a
panel can assess whether the competent authorities' explanation for its determination is reasoned and adequate only if the
panel critically examines that explanation, in depth, and in
light of the facts before the panel. Panels must, therefore,
review whether the competent authorities' explanation fully
addresses the nature, and, especially, the complexities, of the
data, and responds to other plausible interpretations of that
data. A panel must find, in particular, that an explanation is
not reasoned, or is not adequate, if some alternative explanation of the facts is plausible, and if the competent authorities'
explanation does not seem adequate in the light of that alternative explanation."
The most recent Appellate Body Report about the standard
of review under Article II of the DSU relates to a special safeguard measure imposed under the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing. In this Report, the Appellate Body begins by stating:
"[ji]n describing the duties of competent authorities, we simulta(Dec. 22, 2000), at para. 55 [hereinafter

UNITED STATES -

WHEAT GLUTEN APPELLATE

BODY REPORT].

69.
ZEN

UNITED STATES -

LAMB MEAT FROM

DS177 and 'rr/DS178

SAFEGUARD MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF FRESH, CHILLED OR FRO-

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA, APPELLATE BODY REPORT,

(May 1, 2001), at paras. 103 and 106.

WA'T/
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neously define the duties of panels in reviewing the investigations and determinations carried out by competent authorities. ' The Appellate Body further reasons:
In our view, a panel reviewing the due diligence exercised by a
Member in making its determination under Article 6 of the

ATC has to put itself in the place of that Member at the time
it makes its determination. Consequently, a panel must not
consider evidence which did not exist at that point in time. A

Member cannot, of course, be faulted for not having taken
into account what
it could not have known when making its
7
determination. 1
It should be repeated that this standard defines the investigation
duties of the competent national authorities. As regards the
broader question of whether a Member is entitled to adopt or
maintain the safeguard measure, the Appellate Body added that
it may well be that this right lapses as soon as new evidence
emerges, proving that the substantive legal conditions for taking
safeguard action were never satisfied."

In the absence of a divergent special provision, the standard
of review set out for panels in Article 11 of the DSU also applies
to the review of actions taken by national authorities or courts in
the area of competition - to the extent that these actions (or
inactions) are covered by existing WTO law. The clarifications
derived from the Agreement on Safeguards do not directly apply
to individual decisions in the area of competition. They do,
however, correspond to the internal logic of investigations in
this area and are therefore suitable for an application by analogy. They also show the close link between investigation obligations specified for national authorities or courts and the standard of review prescribed for panels, the observance of which
has to be reviewed by the Appellate Body. This link rests upon
the fact that national authorities must make a determination on
the substantive conditions on which the right to adopt a trade
remedy depends (injury, causation, etc.), and the fact that
panels must examine whether national authorities complied
with their duties. Panels must therefore review all the elements
70.

UNITED

STATES -

TRANSITIONAL

SAFEGUARD

YARN FROM PAKISTAN, APPELLVIE BODY REPORT,

71. Id. at para. 78.
72. Id. at para. 81.

MEASURE

ON

COMBED

COYI'ON

AIT/DS192 (Oct. 8, 2001), at para. 73.
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that national authorities must consider. 7' This link should not
be overlooked in the negotiations on a WTO competition agreement.
C. The Special Standard of Review in Article 17.6 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement
As mentioned above, only one of the WTO agreements sets
out a special standard of review that departs from Article 11 of
the DSU - the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade7 1 ("Anti-Dumping
Agreement"). Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall
determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was
unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was
proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion,
the evaluation shall not be overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provision of the
Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a
relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it
75
rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.
This special provision has been negotiated due to pressure
from the United States and is meant to give Members a greater
margin of maneuver than Article 11 of the DSU when they apply
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the academic literature, it has
been suggested that the margin given by Article 17.6(i) should
73. The reverse is not necessarily the case - i.e., one cannot say with certainty that
panels must never consider elements that national authorities, consistently with WTO
law, did not consider. In other words, it is not excluded that there are elements that a
panel must review, although they do not affect the legality of the national determination,
but do decide over whether the trade remedy measure is WTO consistent, namely
whether all the substantive conditions for taking a trade remedy are truly satisfied. See
e.g., supra n.72 and accompanying text.
74. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping), April 15, 1994 WTO Agreement, Annex IA [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement].
75. Id. art. 17.6.
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also be allowed within a competition agreement to be negotiated
within the WTO.7 6 However, according to the findings of the
Appellate Body, Article 17.6(i) ultimately does not differ from
Article 11 of the DSU with regard to the standard applying to the
assessment of facts. In United States - Antidumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, the Appellate Body
states:
Article 17.6(i) requires panels to make an "assessment of the
facts." The language of this phrase reflects closely the obligation imposed on panels under Article II of the DSU to make
an "objective assessment of the facts." Thus the text of both provisions requires panels to "assess" the facts and this, in our view,
clearly necessitates an active review or examination of the pertinent facts. Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
does not expressly state that panels are obliged to make an
assessment of the facts which is "objective." However, it is inconceivable that Article 17.6(i) should require anything other
than that panels make an objective "assessment of the facts of
the matter." In this respect, we see no "conflict" between Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 11 of
the DSU.77
To the extent that these Appellate Body findings do not
cover the issue of evaluatingfacts, it remains possible that Article
17.6(i), by requiring no more than that this evaluation be "unbiased and objective", respects a certain margin of appreciation of
national authorities that is not subject to review.
To our knowledge, no one so far recommended using the
special (legal) standard of review of Article 17.6(ii) of the AntiDumping Agreement for a future competition agreement. It
may be argued that, as opposed to the preceding section (i), section (ii) indeed provides for a departure from the general standard of review applicable under Article 11 of the DSU. This departure, however, is limited to the interpretation of the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. For that reason, its
76. Maria-Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Business Practicesin InternationalTrade and the
Role of the World Trade Organization, 32(3) J. WORLD TRIo)E 117, 145 (1998).
77. UNITED STATES - HoT--ROLLED STEEL. APPELLATE Bony REPORT, supra n.37, at
para. 55. In paragraph 56, this Report gives a revealing example for the conclusions
that can be drawn from the panel's standard of review about the scope of investigation
obligations of national authorities. The Report confirms that there is a close interrelation between the definition of the national authorities' investigation obligations and
the panels' standard of review.
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application should similarly be limited to the interpretation of
the provisions of a future WTO competition agreement if it is to
be included in that agreement. In contrast to the detailed and
precise provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the rules of
a future WTO competition agreement will presumably be formulated in a much more general and open manner. From the very
beginning, they will therefore accord a greater margin of maneuver to Members. Consequently, there will be less need for a
provision such as Article 17.6(ii). 78 Further, as regards the question of the extent to which Article 17.6(ii) provides for a departure from the general standard of legal review, one must first ask
whether the application of the rules of treaty interpretation 79can
If
really result in more than one permissible interpretation.
this is the case, the next question would be to what extent Article
17.6(ii) produces different outcomes than the generally applicable principle of interpretation of public international law "in
dubio mitius."
In summary, it must be acknowledged that competition laws
and individual decisions in the field of competition law are to be
reviewed - to the extent that they fall under existing WTO obligations - in accordance with the standard of review set out in
Article 11 of the DSU. This standard, when applied to the obligations of national authorities under the agreements on trade
remedies, excludes de novo review. It does, however, specify relatively demanding requirements with regard to the duties of investigation and justification of competent national authorities or
courts, provided that one agrees with the proposition that the

78. As regards the interpretation of Article 17.6(ii), see id. at paras. 57-62.
79. One should not be excessively skeptical about such a possibility. In many legal
orders, there are principles of interpretation requiring that laws be interpreted, wherever possible, in accordance with superior law (e.g. Constitutional or European law) or
international law. In practice, these principles of interpretation are far from being inoperative.
In United States - Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body did not have to address this
question. It only assessed whether the approach taken by the domestic authority rested
upon an interpretation that is "permissible" following application of the rules of treaty
interpretation. UNITED STATES - HoT-ROLLED STEEL APPELLATE BODY REPORT, supra
n.37, at para. 172. In other words, it was only decided, as only needed to be decided,
that the interpretation chosen by the national authority was not (one of) the correct
one(s). See also EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON IMPORTS OF COTTON-TYPE BED LINEN FROM INDIA, APPELLATE BODY REPORT,

2001), at paras. 63-65.

WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1,
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described jurisprudence on Article 11 of the DSU should be
transferred to the area of competition.
IX. FACT-HNDING: A WEAK SPOT IN THE WFO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
A. General Remarks
By nature, decisions in the area of competition are fact intensive. They share this attribute with other areas of economic

law and therefore, as stated above, do not differ fundamentally
from investigations regarding safeguards and anti-dumping or
countervailing duties. The relevance of fact-finding to disputes
related to competition was recognized early on: in 1958, a
GATT expert group assessed the question of whether Article XXIII of the GATT 1947 should be applied to restrictive business

practices. The majority of this group was against such an application, among other reasons, because of "the complexities of the
subject" and "the impossibility of obtaining accurate and complete information on private commercial activities in international trade without . . . adequate powers of investigation."8"'
This section will thus examine whether the investigation powers

offered by the current dispute settlement system are adequate.
In the WTO dispute settlement system, fact-finding is one of

the tasks of panels. The Appellate Body's action is limited to a
review of legal questions."
80. GATT, REPORT ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRAxMrCi:ES, L/1015, B.I.S.D. 95/170
(June 2, 1960). B.I.S.D. 9S/176. The minority expressed itself in favor of the possibility
to use Article XXIII of the GATT when a contracting party can show nullification or
impairment caused by a restrictive business practice.
81. See DSU, supra n.47, art. 17.6(ii) ("An appeal shall be limited to issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel."). As is
well known, the distinction between legal and factual questions is difficult. The legal
qualification of facts is certainly one of the legal questions the Appellate Body can review. See EC -

HORMONES APPELiTE Bory REPORT, sumra n.64, at para. 132: "The

consistency or inconsistency of a given fact or set of facts with the requirements of a
given treaty provision is, however, a legal characterization issue. It is a legal question."
The verification of a panel's compliance with Article I I of the DSU in establishing
facts is also one of the legal questions the Appellate Body can review. In paragraph 133
of the EC - HORMONES APPELLATE BODY REPORT, the Appellate Body describes examples

of breaches of Article 11 of the DSU:
The deliberate disregard of, or refusal to consider, the evidence submitted to
a panel is incompatible with a panel's duty to make an objective assessment of
the facts. The willful distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence put
before a panel is similarly inconsistent with an objective assessment of the
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B. The Right of Panels to Seek Information
Article 13 of the DSU entitles panels to seek information in
order to establish the facts necessary to adjudicate a dispute. Article 13 provides:
1. Each Panel shall have the right to seek information and
technical advice from any individual or body which it deems
appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such information
or advice from any individual or body within the jurisdiction
of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member.
A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request
by a panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate. Confidential information which is provided shall not be revealed without formal authorization from
the individual, body, or authorities of the Member providing
the information.
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source and
may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects
of the matter....

The right to seek information, which Article 13 of the DSU gives
to every panel is broad and comprehensive.8 2 In its Report in
Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, the Appellate Body stated:
It is clear form the language of Article 13 that the discretionary authority of a panel may be exercised to request and obtain information, not just "from any individual or body"
within the jurisdiction of a Member of the WTO, but also
from any Member, including afortiori a Member who is a party
to a dispute before a panel. . . . It is equally important to
stress that this discretionary authority to seek and obtain information is not made conditional ... upon the other party to
the dispute having previously established, on a primafacie basis, such other party's claim or defense. Indeed, Article 13.1
imposes no conditions on the exercise of this discretionary aufacts. "Disregard" and "distortion" and "misrepresentation" of the evidence, in
their ordinary signification in judicial and quasi-judicial processes, imply not
simply an error of judgment in the appreciation of evidence but rather an
egregious error that calls into question the good faith of a panel.
Id. This illustration does not exhaust the universe of possible legal errors committed in
the establishment of facts. A logical mistake made in the best faith in the establishment
of facts, for instance, will have to be qualified as a legal mistake.
82. UNITED STATES - IMPORT PROIIIBITION OF CERTAIN SHRIMP AND StIRIMP PRODucTs, APPELLATE B0M REPORT, IAWT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), at paras. 104 and 106.
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thority.8"
Despite the extensive right to seek information of every panel, it
is generally believed that the investigation of facts is among the
weakest spots of the panel procedure.
C. The Duly of Members to SurrenderInformation
Only seemingly, a first weak spot seems to arise from the
very wording of Article 13.1 of the DSU, given that the third sentence expresses the Members' duty to respond to a panel's request for information through the word "should" rather than
"shall." "Should" seems to indicate a "nobile officium" and not
a
legal obligation. In the already mentioned Report in Canada Measures Affecting the Export of CivilianAircraft, the Appellate Body
however found that Article 13.1 imposes an obligation on Members to cooperate and to surrender information:
188. If Members that were requested by a panel to provide
information had no legal duty to 'respond' by providing such
information, that panel's undoubted legal 'right to seek' information . . . would be rendered meaningless. A Member
party to a dispute could, at will, thwart the panel's fact-finding
powers and take control itself of the information-gathering
process that Articles 12 and 13 of the DSU place in the hands
of the panel. A Member could, in other words, prevent a
panel from carrying out its task of finding the facts constituting the dispute before it and, inevitably, from going forward
with the legal characterization of those facts.
189. The chain of potential consequences does not stop
there. To hold that a Member party to a dispute is not legally
bound to comply with a panel's request for information relating to that dispute, is, in effect, to declare that Member legally free to preclude a panel from carrying out its mandate
and responsibility under the DSU. So to rule would be to
reduce to an illusion and a vanity the fundamental right of
Members to have disputes arising between them resolved
through the system and proceeding for which they bargained
in concluding the DSU.84
83.

CANADA -

M

"

ASURLS AFFE(TING Ti-E EXI'ORT OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFI , APPELLATE

Bony R, 'PORT WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999), at para. 185 [hereinafter CANADA

-

AIRCRAfr APPELLATIEF Bony RiP'ORT].

84. Id. at paras. 188-89 (footnote omitted). The interpretation of the word
"should" in Article 13 of the DSU is one of the very few cases in which the Appellate
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D. The Right of Panels to Draw Negative Inferences
A Member can violate its information obligation under Article 13 of the DSU (as happened in Canada - Measures Affecting the
Export of CivilianAircrafts). In that case, the panel may draw negative inferences from the attitude of the non-cooperating Member. The Appellate Body derived this right - the use of which is
left to the discretion of the panel8 5 - from the normal function
of panels as confirmed by Annex V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.8 " Annex V contains rules about
the gathering of information on "serious prejudice" in the case
of "actionable" subsidies. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Annex
state:
6.... Where information is unavailable due to non-cooperation by the subsidizing and/or third country Member, the
panel may complete the record as necessary relying on best
information otherwise available.
7. In making its determination, the panel should draw adverse inferences from instances of non-cooperation8 7by any
party involved in the information-gathering process.
The right to draw negative inferences from the behavior of
the non-cooperating Member is not limited to the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. In the Wheat Gluten dispute, the Appellate Body did not hesitate to apply it also to the
Agreement on Safeguards. However, also in this case, the Appellate Body came to the conclusion that the panel did not overstep
the boundaries of its discretion by refraining from drawing negative inferences.8 8
The general obligation of Members to share information
and the right of panels to draw negative inferences may lead
some to believe that complaints about the weaknesses in the inBody goes beyond the ordinary meaning of the text and bases its interpretation clearly
on the object and purpose of the provision at issue.
85. See infra nn.104-106 and accompanying text.
86. CANADA - AIRCRAFI APPELLATE BODY REPORT, supra n.83, at paras. 198-203.
87. The Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra n.74, contains a similar provision; however, it only applies to national authorities. See Article 6.8, which allows determinations
to be made "on the basis of the facts available," and paragraph 7 of Annex II, which
adds: "[i]t is clear, however, that if an interested party does not cooperate and thus
relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to
a result which is less favorable to the party than if the party did cooperate."
88. UNITED
ras. 170-76.

STATES -

WHEAT GLUTEN APPELLATE

BODY

REPORT,

supra n.68, at pa-
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vestigation of facts are either unfounded or that the panels and
Members are to blame for these weaknesses. One should, however, not rush to such a conclusion. It is very possible that, by
nature, the panel procedure is marked by weaknesses. Before we
deal with the panels, however, it is necessary to mention two
weak spots, of which the first would be relatively easy to overcome, and the second, in contrast, will be overcome only with
difficulty.
E. The Absence of Standard Rules of Procedurefor Panel Proceedings
Immediately after the nomination of its Members, the Appellate Body adopted its own procedural rules. The rules were
adopted pursuant to Article 17.9 of the DSU, which provides:
''working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in
consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the DirectorGeneral, and communicated to the Members for their information." 9 For panel proceedings, such procedural rules do not exist so far. Article 12.1 of the DSU mandates that panels use the
Working Procedures set out in Appendix 3 to the DSU, but these
rules are extremely rudimentary. Article 12.1 authorizes panels
to adopt additional or different rules after consulting with the
parties. A comprehensive set of standard working procedures to
be applied by every panel after consulting the parties, however,
still does not exist. In a number of its Reports, the Appellate
Body pointed out that the existence of such standard working
1 One must also recognize that
procedures would be desirable.""
standard working procedures for panel proceedings chiefly serve
the purpose of ensuring due process and procedural fairness
89. From the perspective of the EU/EC observer, Article 17.9 of the DSU is strprising to the extent that the Statute of the European Court of Justice is laid down in a
Protocol which is part of the EC Treaty and which, only in some part, callbe amended
by the Council, acting unanimously at the request of the Court of justice or the Commission. See Article 245 of the EC Treaty. The Court of Justice adopts its own Rules of
Procedure which, however, require the approval of the Council. The requirement used
to be that of a tinanimotis approval. See Article 245(3) of the EC Treaty in the version of
the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty of Nice replaced the unanimity requirement with
qualified majority voting. See Article 223(6) of the new version of the EC Treaty.
90. ARGENTINA - MEASURES AFFECTING IMi'ORTS OF FooWExAR, TEXTii.is, APPAREL
AND OTHFR ITEMS, APPFLI AiE BorY REPORT, WIT/DS56/AB/R and Corr.1 (Apr. 22,
1998), at para. 79, n.68, with reference to EC - BANANAS IIIAPPELLATF BoDy REPrORT,
supra n.27, at para. 44, and INDIA - PATENT PROTE:TION FOR PHiARMA\tFUTI tAL AND
AGRICUTarURAI CHEMICAL PRODUC-is, Ai'i'I tI I F BorY REPORT, WIT/DS50/AB/R (Dec.
19, 1997), at para. 95.
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(the former includes the latter). They would only contribute to
the investigation of facts if it were possible to solve the structural
problem of the surrender of confidential information, especially
the problem of access to commercial secrets.
F. The Problem of Confidential Information
Everyone who has dealt with competition law or anti-dumping law is familiar with the structural problem of confidential
information. On the one hand, there is the interest in ensuring
an optimal clarification of the facts, which militates in favor of
using confidential information. On the other hand, principles
of due process and procedural fairness require that the principle
of equality between the parties be respected. It is therefore necessary to make confidential information that one party uses available to the other party. How can this fundamental procedural
right be reconciled with the legitimate interest in protecting the
confidentiality, an interest that is particularly relevant with regard to commercial secrets? Where that conflict between the establishment of the truth and the protection of business confidential information cannot be reconciled, the protection of business confidential information prevails at least in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice: the Commission is not entitled to use business confidential information if
due process cannot be guaranteed. 9
All the WTO agreements that are relevant in the present
context require that confidential information be treated as such.
For instance, the Anti-Dumping Agreement regulates the protection of confidentiality in particular detail. Article 6.5 provides:
"any information which is by nature confidential ... or which is
provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation
shall ... be treated as such by the authorities. Such information
shall not be disclosed without specific permission of the party
submitting it."' In order to solve the problems related to due
process, Article 6.5, first subparagraph, provides for an obligation to furnish a non-confidential summary. This rule, however,
91. It should, however, be noted that rules about the use of confidential information in such a case affect the relationship between a "prosecuting" public authority and
a private person. It is not necessarily obvious that it is justified to apply the same restrictions in the legal relationship (and dispute) between two equal parties (such as States).
92. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra n.74, art. 6.5.
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also recognizes that it may exceptionally not be possible to give
such a summary:
The authorities shall require interested parties providing confidential information to furnish non-confidential summaries
thereof. These summaries shall be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence. In exceptional circumstances, such parties may indicate that such information is
not susceptible of summary. In such exceptional circumstances, a statement of the reasons why summarization is not
possible must be provided."
It is true that the Anti-Dumping Agreement attempts to live
up to the principle of due process. Article 6.2 requires that
"throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties
shall have a full opportunity for the defence of their interests." 4
Article 6.9 states: "The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of the essential facts
under consideration which form the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures.""
Ultimately, however, the tension between the establishment
of the truth and the protection of confidentiality remains unresolved. This is apparent from Article 12.2.2, which provides in
a Solomon-like way:
A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an affirmative determination providing for
the imposition of a definitive duty or the acceptance of a
price undertaking shall contain . . . all relevant information
on the matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to
the imposition of final measures on the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the9 6requirement for
the protection of confidential information.
In Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steal and H-Beams from Poland, the panel
undertook the bold attempt of deriving from Article 3.1 7 in con93. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra n.74, art. 6.5.1.
94. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra n.74, art. 6.2.
95. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra n.74, art. 6.9.
96. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra n.74, art. 12.2.2A.
97. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra n.74, art. 13.1. Article 3.1 states: "A determination of injury for the purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive
evidence and involve an objective examination." Id.
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junction with the already mentioned Article 17.6 of the AntiDumping Agreement that it is prohibited to rely on confidential
considerations for the determination of the definitive antidumping duty that have not been made available to the parties.
This attempt, which was understandable from the perspective of
due process, has been thwarted by the Appellate Body. In the
opinion of the Appellate Body, Article 3.1 does not prevent the
competent national authority from relying on confidential information. Such a prohibition of relying on confidential and therefore inaccessible information can also not be derived from the
above-mentioned standard of review stipulated by Article 17.6:
Whether evidence or reasoning is disclosed or made discernible to interested parties by the final determination is a matter
of procedure and due process. These matters are very important,
but they are comprehensively dealt with in other provisions,
notably Articles 6 and 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Articles 17.5 and 17.6(i) require a panel to examine the facts
made available to the investigating authority of the importing
Member. These provisions do not prevent a panel from examining facts that were not disclosed to, or discernible by,98the
interested parties at the time of the final determination.
In Articles 12.2, 12.3, 12.4 and 12.8, the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures contains partially identical, partially similar provisions. The Agreement on Safeguards is less detailed, but also guarantees the protection of confidential information.9 9 Mutatis mutandis, the conclusions of the Appellate
Body in Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
98.

THAILAND -

OR NON-ALLOY

ANrI-DUMPING DUTIES ON ANGLES, SHAPES AND SECTIONS OF IRON

STEEL AND H-BEAMS

FROM

POLAND,

APPELLATE BODY

REPORT,

WT/

DS]22/AB/R (Apr. 5, 2001), at paras 117-18.
99. The pertinent Article 3.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards provides:
Any information which is by nature confidential or which is provided on a
confidential basis shall, be treated as such by the competent authorities. Such
information shall not be disclosed without permission of the party submitting
it. Parties providing confidential information may be requested to furnish
non-confidential summaries thereof or, if such parties indicate that such information cannot be summarized, the reasons why a summary cannot be provided. However, if the competent authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if the party concerned is either unwilling to make
the information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form, the authorities may disregard such information unless it can be
demonstrated to their satisfaction from appropriate sources that the information is correct.
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Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams may probably also be
applied to these two agreements.
The protection of confidential information is not limited to
investigations before national authorities, but extends to panel
proceedings. The already mentioned Article 13 of the DSU, the
rule giving panels their comprehensive right to seek information, also stipulates: "Confidential information which is provided shall not be revealed without formal authorization from
the individual, body or authorities of the member providing the
information."'"'
Consequently, the conflict between the clarification of the
facts, the protection of confidential information and the principle of due process also arises at the level of WTO dispute settlement. None of the existing procedural rules resolves this conflict in either way. Individual panels tried to defuse it by adopting ad hoc procedural rules. In the relationship between the
United States and the European Communities, all these attempts
failed. The European Communities systematically rejected the
proposed procedural rules because they believed that these rules
would have made the confidential information available to an
excessively small number of people without there being any legal
basis in the DSU. They took the position that the confidentiality
obligations of their officials provided for sufficient guarantees
and that the proposed procedural rules put into question the
inviolability of their Geneva Mission (under public international
law).""1 The United States then refused to make confidential information available. Communicating it only to the panel was not
possible due to the prohibition of ex parte communications.""
A fall back option for a panel, where no procedural rules for
the protection of confidential information can be adopted, is to
100. DSU, supra n.47, art. 13.
101. Decision by the Arbitators, EC
e-ime /or the Inpoilation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, N'A/DS27/ARB (Apr. 6, 1999), at paras. 2.4-2.5. The immntnity argument
stems from the fact that the proposed procedural rules would have required the party
receiving confidential information to permit the providing party to inspect the safe in
its Mission. SeeCANADA - AIRCiAt-ri APi'Ei lF Bo)y REPCORT, supra n.83, at paras. 13336, also for further arguments put forward by the European Communities. It is noteworthy that the European Communities added that the problems posed by confidential
information should be resolved through an amendment to the DSU. Id.
102. Article 18.1 of the DSU provides: "There shall be no ex parte communications
with the panel or Appellate Body concerning matters under consideration by the panel
or Appellate Body." /d.
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convince parties to submit information that is aggregated, indexed and/or partly blackened. Such information can be useful
to show the development of individual factors over a set period
of time, without exposing firm-specific details. This fall back option, however, is not a sufficient solution in each and every case.
Even if a panel adopts ad hoc procedural rules for the communication of confidential information, this is not yet any guarantee that a party will actually make such information available.
This is apparent from the already mentioned case Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, in which Canada refused to communicate confidential information although the ad
hoc procedural rules that the panel had adopted essentially corresponded to those proposed by Canada itself."'a Without the
cooperation of the parties, the currently practised procedure for
sharing and protecting information does not work.
In such a case, it may well be appropriate and even indicated that a panel draw negative inferences from the behavior of
the non-cooperating party." 4 Drawing negative inferences, however, is a step that demands quite a bit of courage from panelists
who have been selected for an individual case. 1 5 In addition,
negative inferences are not always the appropriate answer. For
instance, they do not seem justified where a panel does not succeed in adopting ad hoc procedures for the communication of
confidential information. In contrast, where the refusal to transmit confidential information appears to be unjustified or even
ill-minded, a panel should, in discharging its fact-finding duty,
take this into account as an element weighing against the party
concerned. The weight to be attributed to this element is the
panel's decision and obviously depends on all the other factual
elements before that panel. 1.. In making this decision, the
panel as the sole trier of facts enjoys a degree of "discretion" not in the sense that a certain decision is as correct as the opposite decision, but in the sense of an appellate review that is limited to compliance with legal standards.
AIRCRAiF APPEuvITE BODY' REPORT, supra n.83, at para. 195.
104. It is not a surprise that the admissibility of negative inferences has been established in CANADA - AIRCRAFT APPELlVIE BODY REPORT, supra n.83. See supra n.86 and
accompanying text.
105. On structural weaknesses of the panel system, see infra Section IX.G.
106. See also UNITED STATES - WHEAT GLUTEN APPELLATE BODY REPORT, supra n.68
at para. 174.

103. CANADA

1550

FORDHAM INT"ERNA TIONAL 1AWJOURNAL

[Vol. 26:1505

The Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties expressly provide that in certain situations the competent national authority may make a decision on the basis of "available information." Article 6.8 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:
In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or
otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a
reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation,
preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative,
may be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the application of this
1 7
paragraph.
Appendix V to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties contains a similar paragraph 8 which stipulates:
If the subsidizing and/or third-country Member fail to cooperate in the information-gathering process, the complaining
Member will present its case of serious prejudice, based on
evidence available to it, together with facts and circumstances
of the non-cooperation of the subsidizing and/or third-country Member. Where information is unavailable due to noncooperation by the subsidizing and/or third country Member, the panel may complete the record as necessary relying
on best information otherwise available.'"

The quoted rules of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties practically allow national authorities to do the same as panels under the principle of negative inferences. One could think about generalizing these rules and about extending them to all cases of refused
transmission of confidential information. As long as the resort
to such rules remains the decision"' of the body to which the
confidential information has not been made available, there is
107. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supqra n.74, art. 6.8. On the interpretation and application of Article 6.8 and of Annex Il of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, see UNrrE1)
STATES - HoTr-RoI.Iin STFFL AP'PE'LAI i. Bony Ri. PORT, supra n.37, at paras. 77-110.
108. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA.
109. The term "decision", rather than "discretion", has been used intentionally.
For the reasons indicated in this Article, the word "discretion" is problematic. It may
suggest that there are no criteria guiding the decision as to when, in the establishment
of facts, negative inferences are to be drawn and when they are not to be drawn. In
other words, the word "discretion" may suggest that the decision not to draw these
negative inferences is equally correct as the decision to do so.
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no fundamental objection against this generalization and extension. Any additional step, however, would be as questionable as
a systematic and automatic resort to negative inferences that
would set aside the other factual elements before the panel. The
problem of confidential information can, therefore, not be
solved alone through the instrument of negative inferences or
the decision on the basis of best information available.
Decisions in the area of competition by nature are not only
fact intensive. They also require knowledge and evaluation of
confidential information. In competition law, confidential information is even more important than in the areas covered by the
Agreement on Safeguards, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.
The problem of the treatment of confidential information
has correctly been labeled a "serious systemic issue.'l 0 Its resolution is urgent. We believe that, in the long run, the WTO dispute settlement system can only be applied satisfactorily to the
three mentioned areas, if the conflict between clarification of
facts, protection of confidentiality, and the principle of due process can be resolved in a sound manner.
For a future WTO competition agreement, the solution of
the tension between the establishment of the truth, protection
of confidential information and procedural fairness is even more
important. We believe this dilemma to be the most significant
obstacle that must be overcome on the way to a satisfactory arrangement for the settlement of disputes in individual competition cases.
In addition to the quasi-judicial settlement of disputes by
panels and the Appellate Body, the WTO agreements normally
provide for discussions in special Committees that are responsible for the application and supervision of the implementation of
the respective agreements by the Members. The Committees for
the Agreements on Anti-Dumping, Subsidies and Safeguards
may serve as examples.'
A future competition agreement
should establish a similar committee for questions related to
110. UNITED STATES - WHEAT GLUTEN APPELLATE BODY REPORT, supra n.68, at
para. 170.
111. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, art. 16 (establishing the Committee on AntiDumping Practices); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 24 (establishing the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures); Agreement on
Safeguards, art. 13 (establishing the Committee on Safeguards).
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competition. A sort of peer review of individual decisions in the
area of competition would be highly desirable. According to
some of the current proposals, a peer review mechanism is to
play an important role in a future WTO competition agreement,
to some extent, as an alternative to dispute settlement.' 12 The
absence of a satisfactory solution to the problem of confidential
information would, however, also stand in the way of such a peer
review, given that a competent peer review depends on the
knowledge of all relevant facts on which the scrutinized decision
has been based. It can be presumed that the agreement on a
procedure for the protection of confidential information raises
at least as important problems for a system of peer review, as it
does for the quasi-judicial dispute settlement system.'"'
G. The Problem of the Panel Structure
The Appellate Body is a permanent institution.' 14 It is composed of seven Members who are appointed for a term of four
years (with the possibility of one reappointment for another four
years). In contrast, panels are established ad hoc for each dispute. " ' Also, the members of every panel are selected and appointed ad hoc on the basis of a broad range of criteria.' ' The
WTO Secretariat maintains an indicative list of potential panelists from which panel members can be selected.'"' This list, however, is not exhaustive, which means that persons who are not on
the list equally can be and often are appointed as panel members.
Panel members are independent. Article 8.2 of the DSU requires explicitly that panel members should be selected with a
view to ensuring their independence. For the same reasons, Article 8.3 of the DSU excludes citizens of Members whose governments are parties or third parties in the dispute from serving as
112. WTO, REPORT (2001) OF HE WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
PoiI( TO -En GENERAI COUNCIL, Supra n.2 1, at paras. 88-90.
113. This presumption of"at least" eqtuivalent problems relies on the fact that the
information transmitted to a committee responsible lot this peer review would become
available to officials of as many as (currently) 146 Members (pils perhaps observers) as
compared to the mtuch loweI number ofofficials of the (few) Members involved in a
dispute that is already generally governed by rules of confidentiality.
114. See DSU, supra n.47, art. 17, which refers to the "standing Appellate Body."
115. DSU, supra n.47, art. 6.
116. DSU, supra n.47, arts. 8.1-8.3.
117. DSU, supra n.47, art. 8.4.
TRADF AND COMPETITION
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panelists, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise.
Panel members are generally highly qualified persons. Many exercise this function only once, whereas others are re-appointed.
While there is no doubt about the personal independence of
panel members, the rules of the WTO dispute settlement system
do little to guarantee this independence in an institutional
sense. There are only some safeguards based on the obligations
contained in the Rules of Conduct. Because serving on a panel
is an honor and a personal distinction, it is not surprising if a
panel member is interested in being appointed for another
panel in the future.
In contrast to the Appellate Body Members who are appointed for several years, one cannot expect that the ad hoc appointed panel members will act as resolutely as the members of a
permanent institution with regard to the outlined problems of
fact finding. This is particularly true of the problems related to
confidential information and negative inferences.
An additional facet of the weak institutional independence
of panelists arises from the main profession of the individuals
concerned. Many panelists are Geneva-based diplomats or capital-based trade officials. Outside of the dispute, they may often
deal with the diplomats or officials of the parties to the dispute
on other trade matters. The very people participating in the oral
hearing of the panel, i.e., the representatives of the parties and
panelists, may find themselves around the negotiating table the
next day.8

The case for modifying the structure of panels and for guaranteeing the independence of panel members in an institutional
Two means appear to be
manner has previously been made.'
available to achieve that objective. One possibility and proposal
in the current DSU reform negotiations""1 is the establishment
of a permanent panel body with fixed membership, which could
include the creation of chambers for different subject-matters
118. The admittedly caricatured analogy would be that of a national judiciary without a professional body of judges, in which the attorneys, who all know each other,
would take turns sitting on the bench.
119. See Contribution of the European Communities and its Menber States to the Improveient of the WIO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Communication from the European
Communities to the Special Session of the DSB, TN/DS/W/1, Mar. 13, 2002, at 2. The
proposal has received support fiom several other Members.
120. Id.
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(agreements). This solution would probably increase the administrative cost of panel proceedings, and concerns in that regard
have accordingly been expressed in the negotiations. 12' A different, less radical possibility would be the establishment of a closed
list of potential panel members. Such a list would also have to be
of limited length. There are, of course, possible combinations of
the mentioned suggestions: for instance, the panel chairman
could be part of a standing panel body and the other members
could be drawn from a list or selected according to the specific
expertise required.
Reforming the panel structure would significantly enhance
the institutional independence of panelists. If the Members of
the WTO wish to move in that direction, the panel structure
would have to receive priority in the current negotiations on the
revision of the DSU, which resumed after the Doha Ministerial
Conference. 122 If the WTO dispute settlement system were to be
extended to a new competition agreement, the reform would become even more important than it already is now.
X. THE NON-VIOLATION COMPLAINT
This Article has so far focused on the most common form of
complaint under the WTO dispute settlement system, the socalled violation complaint. The Article would, however, be incomplete if it did not briefly mention the already introduced,
much less frequent non-violation complaint. A successful GATT
complaint depends on the nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to a Member directly or indirectly under one of the
agreements, or the impediment of the attainment of any objective of an agreement. According to Article XXIII:I(b) of the
GATT 1994, this condition can also be satisfied by the application by another Member of any measure that does not conflict
with the agreement in question.
The most important non-violation complaint from a competition perspective has been the one about the importation and
sale in Japan of photo films and paper originating in the United
States. The panel report in this dispute, which is commonly
121. See e.g., India's Questions to the Europea? Communities and its Member States on their
Proposal Relating to Improvements of the DSU, CommUnication from India to the Special
Session of the DSB, TN/DS/W/5, May 7, 2002, at 3.
122. See supra n.3.
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known as the Kodak/Fuji case, takes note of the low number of
non-violation complaints that have been raised and examined in
earlier disputes (at that time, the total number was eight). By
quoting a previous panel, the report explains the purpose of Article XXIII:I (b) of the GATT 1994:
The idea underlying the provisions of Article XXIII:I(b) is
that the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a tariff concession can be frustrated
not only by measures proscribed by the General Agreement
but also by measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to encourage contracting parties to make tariff concessions they must therefore be given a right of redress when a
reciprocal concession is impaired by another contracting
party as a result of the application of any measure, whether or
not it conflicts with the General Agreement.' 23
The panel in Kodak/Fuji draws the following conclusion:
This suggests that both the GATT contracting parties and
WTO Members have approached this remedy with caution
and, indeed, have treated it as an exceptional instrument of
dispute settlement. ... The reason for this caution is straightforward. Members negotiate the rules that they agree to follow and only exceptionally would expect to be challenged for
actions not in contravention of those rules.' 2 4
The only Appellate Body Report on a non-violation complaint
states that Article XXIII:I (b) of the GATT 1994 "should be approached with caution and should remain an exceptional remedy." 125
In this vein, it has been suggested in the literature that the
non-violation complaint should not be used as a remedy against
restrictive business practices without prior normative guidance
from the membership of the WTO. 126 This position is also based
on the nature of the few successful non-violation complaints to
123. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY -

PAYMENTS AND SUBSIDIES PAID TO PROCES-

SORS AND PRODUCERS OF OILSEEDS AND RELATED ANIMAL-FEED PROTEINS, PANEL REPOWRI,

B.I.S.D. 37S/86 (Jan. 25, 1990), at para. 144.
124. JAPAN - FILM PANEL REPORT, supra n.23, at para. 10.37.
125. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - MEASURES AFFECTING ASBESTOS AND ASBESTOS-CONTAINING PRODUCTS, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, WT/DS135/AB/R (Apr. 5, 2001), at para.
186. The quoted language was borrowed from JAPAN - FILM PANEL REPORT, supra n.23,
at para. 10.37.
126. Roessler, Should Principles of Competition Policy Be Incorporated Into WJ7O Law
Through Non-Violation Complaints?, supra n.52, at 420.
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date,1 7 which were either in line with the Contracting Parties'

normative guidance, 2 1 or, today, would be treated as violation
cases. 12 ' A final argument is the historic evolution from a consultation and negotiation forum to binding third-party adjudication which must not "add to or diminish the rights and obliga-

tions '' :"" provided in the WTO Agreement.''
Non-violation complaints accordingly may appear not to be
the intuitive remedy to be taken wherever restrictive business
practices impede imports. Yet, the potential, and practically difficult,

32

role of the non-violation complaint in this field has not

only been demonstrated by the Kodak/Fuji dispute, but has been
recognized already quite early. The GATT expert group assessing restrictive business practices under Article XXIII of the

GATT 1947 specifically dealt with the question of whether nonviolation complaints against restrictive business practices should
be possible.'
There is no doubt that restrictive business practices can obstruct market access similarly to a governmental import restriction and they, therefore, can impede the value of a
trade concession. Accordingly, Jagdish Bhagwati argued in 1994
that, through non-violation complaints, competition policy re127. WORKING PARTY REPORT, TH. AUSTRALIAN SUBSIIY ON AMtMONIUM SULPIIATF,
B.I.S.D. 11/188 (Apr. 3, 1950); TREATMENT BY GERMANY OF IMPORTS OF SARDINES, PANEL
REPORT, B.I.S.D. 1S/53 (Oct. 31, 1952); EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY - FOLLOWUP ON THE PANEL REPORT "PAYMENTS AND SUBSIDIES PAID TO PROCESSORS AND PRODUCERS
AND RELATED ANIMAL-FED PROTEINS", PANEL REPORT, B.I.S.D. 39S/91
(Mar. 31, 1992).
128. The decision adopted by consensus in 1955 that a contracting party, having
negotiated a tariff concession, may be assumed to have a reasonable expectation that
the value of that concession will not subsequently be impaired by the introduction or
increase of a subsidy. REPORT OF THE REVIEW WORKING PARI ON "OTHER BARRIERS TO
TRADE" in the 1954-55 Review Session, L/334 and Addendum, adopted on March 3,
1955, B.I.S.D. 3S/222, 224, at para. 13.
129. Roessler, Should Principles of Conpetition Policy Be Incoiporated into WiFO Law
Through Non-Violation Complaints?, supra n.52, at 419.
130. DSU, supra n.47, art. 3.2.
131. Roessler, Should Principles oJ Competition Policy Be Incorporated into WIO Law
Through Non-Violation Complaints?, supra n.52, at 420.
132. Anderson & Holmes, supra n.2, at 551.
133. B.I.S.D. 9S/170. We recall that the majority of this group was against such an
application, among other reasons, because of "the complexities of the subject" and "the
impossibility of obtaining accurate and complete information on private commercial
activities in international trade withoLt. .. adequate powers of investigation." See supra
n.80 and accompanying text. In this Section, we will, in contrast, examine the question
to what extent de lege lata non-violation complaints (ire possible.
OF OILSEEDS
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lated questions could be brought before the GATT.' 4 Finally,
the above argument that dispute settlement must not "add to or

diminish the rights and obligations" uner the WTO Agreement
can easily be turned on its head: panels and the Appellate Body
must not disregard what the non-violation complaint already
covers.

A non-violation complaint is successful only if three cumulative conditions are satisfied: (1) the application of a measure by
a Member; (2) the existence of a concession or an advantage
resulting in a benefit accruing to another Member directly or
indirectly under the agreement in question, and (3) the nullification or impairment of this benefit as a consequence of the
5
measure of the other Member.1
Anti-competitive behavior of private actors without governmental link does not satisfy the first condition. Competition related norms - such as a formal competition act - certainly fall
within the concept of a Member's measure. Whether the same is
true about individual decisions in the area of competition will

probably be the object of different views. Text and purpose of
Article XXIII:I (b) of the GATT 1994 militate in favor of a broad
interpretation of the concept "measure."'"" It would be more

difficult to qualify inaction of a competition authority as a mea3 7
sure. Complete inaction is not the application of a measure,
but a measure might be seen in a positive decision not to intervene in a particular case of anti-competitive private behavior,' 3 8
in an abrogation of a piece of competition legislation, in an exemption and in the combination of instances of intervention
and of non-intervention. The limits imposed on the application
of Article XXIII:I (b) of the GATT 1994, therefore, seem to be
similar to those relevant for Article XXIII:I (a) combined with
Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994. In other words, the non-violation
134. Quoted in Roessler, Should Principles of Competition Polic , Be lncotporated into
WI'O Laow Through Non-Violation Complaints?, supra n.52, at 414.
135. JAPAN - FILM PANEL REPORT, supra n.23, at para. 10.41.

136. Id. at paras. 10.42-10.60.
137. Petros C. Mavroidis & Sally J. Van Siclen, The Application of the GA7T/WTO
Dispute Resolution System to Competition Issues, 31 J. WoRL

TRADE

5, 11 (1997).

138. On the other hand, such non-inter-vention can be seen as toleration and
hence, passivity. On the basis of a teleological argument, however, Hoekman & Mavroidis have qualified "passive tolerance of a restrictive business practice" as "application
of a measure." See Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, Competition, Competition
Policy, and the GATI, 17 WORLU ECONOMY 121, 141 and 145 (1994).
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complaint also depends on the existence of some competition
related norms and/or and their application. In contrast, it does
not cover the more likely case that customs concessions are nullified or impaired by nothing more than private agreements.'
The two other conditions of a successful non-violation complaint do not give rise to any particularity that would have to be
discussed in the present context. For the sake of brevity, these
conditions will not be discussed here. Instead, one may refer to
the thorough reasoning in the panel report in Kodak/Fuji. 40
XI. THE SITUATION COMPLAINT
The preceding analysis has shown that competition related
actions of Members already de lege lata must comply with important WTO obligations and that, in addition, non-violation complaints may be filed with regard to a Member's measures taken
in the area of competition. It has also been established, however, that such obligations, and equally a non-violating measure
- unusual circumstances aside - require the existence of compe-

tition laws or other positive action by a Member. Purely private
conduct combined with the absence of competition laws or their
non-application 41' can most probably only be caught by the socalled "situation complaint." However, there is no precedent in
the history of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system for
such a situation complaint. Situation complaints have been
raised in a number of cases, 4 2 but none of them resulted in a
panel or Appellate Body report with findings based on Article XXIII:1 (c) of the GATT 1994. Should such a complaint on
the basis of governmental inaction against a private anti-competitive behavior be brought, one may expect the objection that the
obligation to adopt and enforce competition laws must not be
introduced into WTO law through the back door of the rather
extraordinary situation complaint. Due to the absence of rulings
139. The situation is different, of course, where a Member's government in some
way contributes to the anti-competitive private behavior or to its effects (and where
other particularities like the ones just mentioned qualify as a measure).
140. JAPAN - FILM PANEL REPORT, supra n.23, at paras. 10.61-10.81 (for the second
condition) and paras. 10.82-10.89 (for the third condition).
141. Except in the case where inaction in one case is coupled with positive action
in another, similar case.
142. See I GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAw AND PRACTICE,
ll.A.2.(5)(b) (6th ed. 1995).
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based on situation complaints, it has also been argued that Article XXIII:I(c) of the GATT has fallen into desuetudo.143 However, even if it remained largely unused to date, the situation
complaint is an established and confirmed 144 part of WTO
law. 145 Therefore, what this complaint covers, is already part of
the world trading system and would not be introduced as a new
dimension. In the literature, it has specifically been suggested
that legislative or administrative governmental inaction against
privately erected market barriers may be a case of application of
the situation complaint. 46 The fear that the situation complaint
could give rise to an obligation to adopt or enforce competition
laws is also exaggerated in that the quasi-judicial rules and procedures of the DSU apply only up to the circulation of the panel
report. 147 Regarding the adoption and the surveillance and implementation of recommendations and rulings, the old dispute
settlement rules and procedures contained in the Decision of
April 12, 1989 continue to apply.14 It remains that the solution,
which is adopted at the conclusion of a situation dispute (and
accepted by the respondent), may provide for the responding
government's intervention against the anti-competitive private
behavior. Certainly, given the role of situation complaints in the
practice, it is not the most likely scenario that a situation complaint of the kind described will emerge in the current dispute
settlement system, 149 and others have questioned whether this
would provide an appropriate forum,' 511 or even argued that
143. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Violation Complaints and Non-violation Complaints
in Public InternationalTrade Law, 34 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 227 (1991)..
144. See DSU, supra n.47, art. 26.2. See also Roessler, The Concept of Nullification and
Impairment in the Legal System of the World Trade Organization, supra n.52, at 140.
145. Given that the existence of the situation complaint was reconfirmed in the
Uruguay Round, it would be difficult to imagine that a dispute settlement panel entrusted with the task of assessing a situation complaint would rule that situation complaints no longer exist.
146. Roessler, The Concept of Nullification and Impairment in the Legal System of the
World Trade Organization, supra note 52, at 139-40; Mavroidis & Van Siclen, supra n.138,
at 12, n.10; Matsushita, supra n.48, at 370-71.
147. DSU, supra n.47, art. 26.2. It appears that Article 26.2 of the DSU excludes
the possibility of an appeal against a panel report on a situation complaint. The consequence is that the Appellate Body would not be called to review the legal criteria for a
successful situation complaint developed by the panel on the basis of Article XXIII:I (c)
of the GATT 1994 and Article 26.2 of the DSU.
148. B.I.S.D. 36S/61-67.
149. Mavroidis & Van Siclen, supra n.138, at 12, n.10.
150. Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra n.139, at 139.
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such a course of action would be "risky" and "premature." ''
Should such a situation complaint nevertheless be brought,
the legal standards to be employed for the decision about its success would have to be developed by the panel concerned. In the
literature, it has been suggested that, similarly to non-violation
complaints, the complainant would have to establish that it had
a reasonable expectation that the situation would not occur and,
in addition, a reasonable expectation that the government
would intervene to correct this measure. 52 Without discussing
in any detail the nature of the yet unknown conditions for a successful situation complaint, it should just be pointed out that
these conditions could also be easier to satisfy than suggested,
given that a cartel can erect barriers to the market access of foreign competitors that are equivalent to a governmental import
restriction (as regards the effect on importers). It should finally
be mentioned that the difficulties of the fact-finding process of a
situation dispute arising from restrictive business practices are
likely to be significant, 51 which reaffirms the statements made in
154
this Article in that connection.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion is simple: despite the fact that the existing
WTO law already contains obligations with regard to the design
and application of competition laws, there is a great interest in
the negotiation of additional and specific commitments within a
new WTO competition agreement.
To the extent that WTO law already imposes standards for
the design and application of competition laws, the existing dispute settlement system of the WTO applies. Its non-application
to new and additional rules to be negotiated within a future
WTO competition agreement would be a step back - not in a
formal sense, but in a substantive sense.
The existing dispute settlement system of the WTO provides
for a standard of review which is also appropriate for competition law. The WTO dispute settlement system, however, shows a
151. MMtsUshita, supra n.48, at 370-71.
152. Roessler, The Concept (!f
Nullijicahion and Impairment in the Legal .System of the
World Trade Orgadnization, slmIra n.52, at 139-40.
153. Id. at 140.
154. See stpra Sec. IX.
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number of weaknesses in the area of fact-finding, which should
become particularly noticeable in the examination of competition-related individual decisions by domestic competition authorities. These weaknesses are present in the procedure followed by panels, to whom the establishment of facts is reserved.
The most serious weakness relates to the problem of the communication of confidential information. There has not been a satisfactory solution to this problem so far, although the need for
such a solution is pressing. The current review of the WTO dispute settlement system should provide an opportunity to find
such a solution.
The current review of the dispute settlement system should
also be used in order to improve the panel structure. It should
guarantee greater institutional independence of panels and
their members.

